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TOO HIGH A PRICE FOR TRUTH: THE




A client who seeks legal assistance for the purpose of committing a
crime or fraud will not be shielded by the attorney-client privilege. Pro-
fessor Fried traces the history of the crime-fraud exception, discusses its
rationale, and reviews its expansion. He then compares the exception
with an attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality. Professor Fried con-
cludes that the attorney-client privilege has been seriously eroded
through an overly expansive interpretation and application of the crime-
fraud exception and urges a re-examination of the developments in fed-
eral criminal law that have led to this erosion.
The client's privilege to prevent his or her attorney from testifying in court
about matters that the attorney learned in professional confidence has long been
qualified by an important exception. A client who has sought assistance for the
purpose of committing a crime or fraud' (others add: "or tort")2 cannot require
secrecy. The privilege ends when the client seeks to involve the attorney in
t Associate Professor, University of Montana Law School. B.A. 1971, Cornell University;
J.D. 1976, Harvard University Law School.
1. A more precise definition would not be helpful; the application of the exception never turns
on precise statutory or code language even in those few jurisdictions that have adopted a statutory
definition. An often-cited definition of the attorney-client privilege appears as dictum in United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) (Wyzanski, J.):
The privilege applies only if(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by
his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding,
and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
This definition is misleading to the extent that it implies that the party claiming the privilege
must establish that he or she did not consult an attorney "for the purpose of committing a crime or
tort." The burden of establishing a right to the attorney-client privilege is indeed on the claimant,
but the proponent of the exception has the burden of showing the claimant's unlawful purpose.
Judge Wyzanski's statement of the rule of privilege is an expansion of Professor Wigmore's
version:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by him-
self or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (J. MeNaughten rev. ed.
1961). The MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) expresses the exception to the attorney-client privi-
lege in Rule 212: "No person has any privilege. . . if the judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside
from the communication, has been introduced to warrant a finding that the legal service was sought
or obtained in order to enable or aid the client to commit or to plan to commit a crime or a tort."
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wrongdoing. It also ends when the client takes advantage of legal counsel to
plan a crime or fraud, perhaps by tailoring evidence or testimony to the require-
ments of law that the client has learned from his or her attorney. Thus the
exception applies whether the client discloses an evil intention to the attorney
(making the attorney and client partners), conceals such intention (making the
attorney a dupe), or forms such intention only after obtaining legal counsel.
3
Therefore, there may be no privilege even though the attorney is innocent of any
wrongdoing.
The principle of the exception suggests certain preliminary inquiries in
every fact situation. Did the client consult the attorney with respect to past
actions and their possible legal consequences so that the communications are
privileged, no matter how wrongful or reprehensible the conduct, or was the
consultation with respect to the client's plans for future action? If the latter, did
the client seek to know the boundaries of the law to conform his or her behavior
to them or to transgress them?
These questions suggest problems of definition and of proof. Past and fu-
ture wrongdoing are not easily separable categories. 4 The client's purpose in
This formulation was copied in UNIF. R. EVID. 26 (1953) and has been adopted in Kansas. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-426(b) (1983).
The Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court proposed Rule 503(d)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence to provide that there is no privilege when "the services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably
should have known to be a crime or fraud." 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1973). This language was copied in
UNIF. R. EVID. 502(d)(1) (1974) and has been adopted in several states. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-
1001 (1979), Rule 502(d)(1); DEL. R. EVID. 502(d)(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502(4)(a) (West 1979);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1980), Rule 503(d)(1); ME. R. EVID. 502(d)(1); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 49.115.1 (1979); N.M. R. EvID. 503(d)(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502.D.1 (West 1980);
OR. REv. STAT. § 40.225(4)(a) (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-5(1) (1979); Tax. R.
EVID. 503(e)(1); VT. R. EvID. 502(d)(1); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.03(4)(a) (West 1975).
The sections of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence codifying the law of privilege provoked
a storm of criticism and were rejected in tote by Congress, which substituted Rule 501:
[Tihe privilege of a witness. . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness...
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
The language of the first sentence is derived from the Supreme Court's language in Wolfle v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934). The Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47
(1980), a case involving spousal immunity, made it plain that the proposed rules may not be re-
garded as authoritative statements of federal law in the face of Congress' considered rejection of
them; Congress endorsed the continuing common-law evolution of the privilege. A number of states
have followed Congress and substituted an analogue to Rule 501 for the detailed provisions of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence. See eg., ARIZ. R. EVID. 501; COLo. R. EVID. 501; MICH. R, EVID.
501; MINN. R. EVID. 501; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (Supp. 1981), Rule 501; OHIo R. EVID. 501;
Wyo. R. EvID. 501.
2. Some modern definitions of the crime-fraud exception include torts as well. See supra note
1. The courts have scarcely ever followed these definitions. See 2 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 213 (1978); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3D 861, 865 (1965). But see Coleman v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Corp., 106 F.R.D. 201, 207-09 (D.D.C. 1985) (dictum) (exception includes com-
munications in furtherance of sexual harassment). Rather, the courts have expanded the exception
by exploiting the notorious ambiguity of the word "fraud" to include many kinds of wrongdoing that
do not qualify as civil fraud in the strict sense. See infra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
4. A classic example is the client who informs his or her attorney after the close of testimony
but before the close of the case that he or she has committed peijury. Such wrongdoing is in the
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consulting an attorney is hard to determine without knowing what facts the cli-
ent disclosed; whether the facts varied, intentionally or otherwise, from the
truth; what the attorney advised; and whether the client took the attorney's ad-
vice. The confidentiality of the client's communications is at risk, however, if
the communications must be disclosed before the court decides whether to admit
them into evidence.-
Although the crime-fraud exception to the privilege has antecedents tracea-
ble to at least 1743,6 a host of practical questions about its application has arisen
just in the past twenty years. A review of the digests suggests an extraordinary
increase in attempts to compel the testimony of attorneys in both civil and crimi-
nal cases.7 This increase has caused an extensive development of the law con-
cerning the attorney-client privilege in general8 and has led to new resolutions of
such difficulties as the application of the privilege to corporate employees 9 and
in intracorporate actions, whether direct or derivative.10
The crime-fraud exception has not remained static in the course of this de-
velopment. The courts have faced constant pressure to expand the reach of the
exception, for example by finding an analogous exception to the work-product
immunity established by Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'1
or by steadily relaxing the standards for the showing that must be made by the
proponent of the exception.' 2 In addition, the criminalization of numerous
kinds of corporate misbehavior and of violations of administrative law has ex-
tended the reach of the exception by defining as "crime" many sorts of wrongdo-
ing that do not qualify as civil fraud by traditional standards.' 3 This trend is
inseparable from the great increase in prosecutions of business frauds and white-
collar and organized crime, especially at the federal level. Such prosecutions
often present formidable difficulties of proof, with a concommitant temptation to
gather evidence from the mouths of the defendants' attorneys. On the civil side,
past, but the client is implicitly inviting the attorney to rely upon the false evidence in closing argu-
ments. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text; see also Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality and the
Adversary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 653, 682 (past wrongdoing may constitute present
fraud, if the "contextualizing event" is not over).
5. See infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., NINTH DECENNIAL DIG. Witnesses §§ 192-207 (1983).
8. For an overview, see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Con-
stitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 464 (1977).
9. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (rejecting the "control group test,"
which looks at whether the employee is "responsible for directing [the corporation's] activities in
response to legal advice" when determining the application of the attorney-client privilege to com-
munications made by a corporate employee to the attorney, United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223,
1225 (1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
10. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102-04 (5th Cir. 1970) (creating a new exception,
borrowing certain of the elements of the crime-fraud exception as "factors"), cerL denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971). But cf Dickerson v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 93, 100, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1982) (California courts have no power to create analogous exception under Evidence Code).
11. See, eg., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979).
12. See infra notes 83-138 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 139-99 and accompanying text.
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the crime-fraud exception is exploited in discovery to harass the opponent's at-
torneys and even to compel their disqualification.
Faced with grand jury subpoenas of potential defendants' attorneys and
motions to take the depositions of opposing attorneys, the courts have not done
well. Taking the crime-fraud exception as a clear-cut rule of law and applying it
mechanically, without understanding its underlying principles or historical de-
velopment, the courts have been led to expand the exception insensibly.
1 4 Of
course, in many cases, the courts' willingness to compel the testimony of attor-
neys stems not from bad analysis but from a developed theory of the ethics of
attorney-client relations that is hostile to the privilege.
This Article traces the history of the crime-fraud exception; discusses the
varying rationales advanced in its favor at different periods; and reviews how the
exception has been expanded, both procedurally and substantively, in recent
cases. The crime-fraud exception is compared and contrasted with the attor-
ney's ethical obligation or privilege to expose a client's wrongdoing in general,
about which the profession has been at loggerheads for several years. The Arti-
cle concludes that the exception has been abused and distorted, above all in the
service of federal prosecutors, to the point where the attorney-client privilege
has been seriously eroded.
I. THE PREHISTORY OF THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
A. The Annesley Case
Any discussion of the history of the crime-fraud exception must begin with
Annesley v. Earl ofAnglesea, 15 a case celebrated on the one hand for its facts, at
once mysterious, lurid, and funny; and on the other hand for the unsurpassed
cogency and vigor of its examination of the attorney-client privilege. Nonethe-
less, the case barely qualifies as an ancestor of the modern crime-fraud excep-
tion. 16 If the opinion is read narrowly, the court merely held that there is no
privilege for communications with attorneys unless the communications were
14. See infra notes 83-265 and accompanying text.
15. 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1139 (1743).
16. Early treatises on evidence have remarkably little to say about Annesley. Blackstone men-
tioned the attorney-client privilege and distinguished between "mere matters of fact, as the execution
of a deed or the like" and "secrets of the cause." 3 IV. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370, Other-
wise he seems to have been unaware of any exceptions. The exception is not mentioned, and Annes-
ley is not cited in THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. London 1760) (1st ed. London 1717). This work,
by a "late learned judge," is commonly attributed to Chief Baron (Sir Geoffrey) Gilbert, who died in
1727. The 1791 revision by Capel Lofft and later editions allude rather ambiguously to the excep-
tion. See infra note 31.
In the early 19th century, Phillips treated the privilege at some length. He recognized no crime-
fraud exception, but distinguished carefully between communications for the purpose of seeking
legal advice, collateral facts within the attorney's knowledge, "fact[s] which he might have known
without being intrusted as attorney in the cause," and transactions to which the attorney was a
party. I S. PHILLIPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 104 (2d Am. ed. New York 1820)
(lst Am. ed. New York 1816).
Thomas Peake's treatment, in COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (J. Randall ed. 1812),
is essentially similar to Phillips'. Peake was not familiar with any exception to the attorney-client
privilege except in those cases in which the lawyer is required to testify because of knowledge gained
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made to obtain legal counsel, which is a truism. For almost a century and a half,
Annesley was rarely cited or discussed, even for this narrow proposition. 17 The
crime-fraud exception either went unrecognized or was confined to narrow lim-
its until 1884 when the Queen's Bench, in Regina v. Cox ,18 brought some order
to the confused precedents and laid the foundation for the modem scope of the
exception. Thus, this Article refers to the period from Annesley to Cox as the
"prehistory" of the exception. Nonetheless, Annesley is worth discussing, both
for its intrinsic interest and because its presuppositions and conclusions are
much at odds with the modem approach to the fraudulent client.
James Annesley, a young man of twenty-seven, came to England from the
West Indies in 1742 with an extraordinary story. He claimed to be the son of
Arthur Baron Altham, who died in Ireland in 1727, and the rightful heir both to
the barony and to the Earldom of Anglesea (or Anglesey), to which his uncle
had succeeded in 1737. As heir to the Earldom, he stood to inherit the largest
estate in Great Britain, which consisted of Irish lands that had been granted to
the first Earl by Oliver Cromwell in the mid-seventeenth century.
James claimed that upon the death of his father, the Baron, his wicked
uncle kidnapped him, sold him "for a common slave" (an indentured servant),
and shipped him to the American colonies. Uncle Richard was able to do this
deed because Baron Altham had put away his supposedly unfaithful wife (after
first cutting off her lover's ear) when James was seven. The Baron had then
taken a mistress, who induced him to turn little James out on the streets of
Dublin where he was supported by several people, partly out of kindness and
partly for hope of advantage, until he was kidnapped. James' term of servitude
was lengthened by several years because of an attempted escape, but eventually
he was set free and shipped for England from the West Indies as a common
seaman in the Royal Navy. 19
apart from any confidential communication by a client, e.g., as an attesting witness to an instrument,
or as a business agent. Id. at 181-83.
The analysis in Simon Greenleaf's influential American treatise also contains no hint of a crime
or fraud exception other than the case of an attorney who is party to fraud. I S. GREENLEAF, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 240, 242 (reprint ed. 1972) (1st ed. Boston 1842).
17. See supra note 16. Annesley is mentioned in Professor Thomas Starkie's early 19th century
treatise:
Nor in general [does the privilege apply] to any communication, although made to an
attorney which is not made in professional confidence. In the case of Annesley v. The Earl
ofAnglesea, it was held, that a conversation which had been held twenty years ago between
the Earl of Anglesea and his attorney, as to the prosecution of the plaintiff for murder,
might be inquired into, since it was not matter of professional confidence.
2 T. STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 398 (2d Am. ed. Boston 1828)
(1st Am. ed. Boston 1826).
18. 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884). See infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
19. Surprisingly, there is good reason to believe this story. Documentary evidence was intro-
duced showing that one James Hennesley [sic] was indentured before the Lord Mayor of Dublin on
March 26, 1728. James Annesley appeared on the passenger list of the James as an indentured
servant shortly thereafter. Annesley, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS at 1213.
Andrew Lang, in an extended introduction to a collection of trial transcripts and other docu-
ments, concludes that the kidnapping did take place, but declines to say definitely whether James
was the legitimate or illegitimate son of Lord Arthur (or possibly of Uncle Richard). See THE
ANNESLEY CASE (A. Lang ed. 1912). The kidnapping and the Earl's later actions would seem sure
evidence of guilt in anyone else, but as Lang justly remarks: "Both brothers by their unvarying
1986]
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Soon after his arrival in England, however, James had the misfortune to
shoot a gamekeeper. The Earl, hearing of this occurrence, saw a chance once
more to put James out of the way. He commissioned his attorney of twenty
years, John Giffard, to prosecute James for murder. Giffard did so, but the jury
brought in a verdict of "death by chance-medley"-accidental death-after a
trial marked by an early use of forensic evidence. 20
James was now free to try the title to the estates by an action of ejectment
brought in the Exchequer in Dublin.21 One would imagine that it would be easy
to establish whether Lady Altham bore a son to her husband in 1715. The wit-
nesses, however, offered reams of circumstantially detailed but flatly contradic-
tory testimony. They could not even agree whether Lady Altham had been
pregnant. 22 (It is highly probable that both sides suborned perjury.) Therefore,
the key testimony proved to be that of John Giffard, the Earl's longtime solici-
tor. As represented by plaintiff's counsel, Giffard would testify that the Earl
said:
I am advised that it is not prudent for me to appear publicly in the
prosecution, but I would give 10,OOO to have him hanged. . . .I am
in great distress; I am worried by my wife in Ireland; Mr. Charles
Annesley is at law with me for part of my estate, and . . . . [i]f I
cannot hang James Annesley, it is better for me to quit this kingdom
and go to France, and let Jemmy have his right, if he will remit me into
France 3,OOO a-year; I will learn French before I go.
23
Whether the Earl's statements were privileged was intensely debated. The
court, consisting of three distinguished Barons of the Exchequer, finally con-
cluded that they were not, and Giffard was permitted to testify before the jury.
It took the court only two hours (some accounts say half-an-hour) to find for
James.
24
falseness, treachery, and evil temper seem actually to have sought the troubles which befell them."
Id. at 4.
An unpublished study by Lillian de ]a Torre, of Colorado Springs, which she has kindly permit-
ted me to read, reaches similar conclusions. Miss de ]a Torre has asked me, however, not to disclose
her original and very plausible theory as to James Annesley's true identity, based in part on newly
discovered documents.
20. Trial of Annesley & Redding, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1094 (1742).
21. The sole issue in the case was whether Lord and Lady Altham had a son born alive in
wedlock, whose remainder under the will of the third Earl (also James) would vest in possession
after the death of Arthur the fourth Earl of Anglesea (Baron Altham's cousin) without male issue in
1737. Annesley, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS at 1143-48, 1255-58. If Baron Altham had such a
son, his younger brother Richard concededly had no claim. Id. at 1148-49. To a modem lawyer, it
also would seem necessary to prove that James Annesley, the fictional lessor of plaintiff in ejectment,
was Baron Altham's son, or else plaintiff would have no standing. In fact, some persons who had
known James as a child testified unhesitatingly-if not very credibly-that they recognized the child
in the grown man. Id. at 1178, 1182, 1191, 1193, 1195-97, 1199, 1203. The Earl did not claim that
James was a mere imposter. James, like the Earl, was disqualified from testifying as an interested
party under the rules of evidence of the day.
22. Id. at 1150-57 (eyewitnesses to the pregnancy and to a former pregnancy that was ended by
miscarriage); id. at 1262, 1266, 1267-68, 1272, 1274, 1275, 1282, 1288, 1291 (Lady Altham was
never pregnant).
23. Id. at 1224.
24. Id. at 1443. James never obtained either the property or the titles. Much of the same
evidence was presented at the perjury trial of one of the Earl's principal witnesses, Mary Heath; she
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The view that this decision establishes the crime-fraud exception is based on
certain sweeping arguments made by Annesley's attorneys. They assumed, or
pretended to assume, that the Earl's remarks to his solicitor disclosed a wicked
plan to have James hanged for a murder of which he was innocent. It would be
intolerable, they said, to conceal such a plan under the cloak of privilege. One of
Annesley's attorneys, Serjeant Tisdall, stated:
If he is employed as an attorney in any unlawful or wicked act, his
duty to the public obliges him to disclose it; no private obligations can
dispense with that universal one, which lies on every member of the
society, to discover every design which may be formed, contrary to the
laws of the society, to destroy the public welfare. For this reason I
apprehend, that if a secret, which is contrary to the public good, such
as a design to commit treason, murder, or perjury, comes to the knowl-
edge of an attorney, even in a cause wherein he is concerned, the obli-
gation to the public must dispense with the private obligation to the
client .... 25
Another of Annesley's attorneys, Mr. Harward, made a similar argument:
I take the distinction to be, that where an attorney comes to the knowl-
edge of a thing that is malum in se, against the common rules of moral-
ity and honesty, though from his client, and necessary to procure
success in the cause, yet it is no breach of trust in him to disclose it, as
it can't be presumed an honest man would engage in a trust that by law
prevented him from discharging that moral duty all are bound to, nor
can private obligation cancel the justice owing by us to the public.
2 6
These are stirring statements of the public duty of the legal profession, but their
application to the facts in Annesley is dubious. Was the Earl's desire to see
Jemmy hanged "a design to commit treason, murder or perjury"? James had
certainly killed the gamekeeper; no evidence was presented to show that the
Earl, in Ireland, knew any of the surrounding circumstances. Neither was there
any testimony which showed that the Earl had bribed witnesses or jurors or
otherwise sought to influence the outcome. The judges made clear that there
was nothing unethical in Giffard's undertaking the prosecution, which he appar-
ently did after a grand jury had already indicted the defendant. 27 Furthermore,
Serjeant TisdaU's statement that all members of society are obliged to reveal
illegal schemes which come to their knowledge may be morally unexceptionable,
but it does not refer to any legal duty.
The judges' opinions were based upon plaintiff's argument that a privileged
communication must be relevant to the subject concerning which the client con-
was acquitted after a questionable charge. Trial of Heath, 18 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1, 196
(1744). James died in 1760 and his uncle in 1761. The uncle's extraordinary career as a bigamist led
after his death to the extinction of the peerage by action of the Parliamentary committee of privileges
in 1771. "Annesley, James" and "4nnesley, Richard" in DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
477-79 (L. Stephen & S. Lee reprint ed. 1949-1950).
25. Annesley, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS at 1229.
26. Id. at 1232. As the rule took shape, Harward's implied limitation of the exception to ac-
tions of the client that were mala in se was generally followed. See infra note 31. The modem
exception knows no such limitation.
27. Id. at 1250 and footnote.
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suited his lawyer-that is, facts "necessary to have been communicated. '28 In
retaining Giffard to prosecute James, the Earl had no need to discuss his hopes
and fears or to express any opinion about "Jemmy's right." Therefore, the Earl
had spoken to Giffard not as his attorney but merely as a friend, and whatever
expectation of confidentiality the Earl might have had, Giffard could be com-
pelled to testify to facts that he did not learn in the role of an attorney.
Nor do I see any impropriety in supposing the same person to be
trusted in one case as an attorney or agent, and in another as a com-
mon acquaintance. In the first instance, the Court will not permit him,
though willing, to discover what came to his knowledge as an attorney,
because it would be in breach of that trust which the law supposes to
be necessary between him and his employer: but where the client talks
to him at large as a friend, and not in the way of his profession, I think
the Court is not under the same obligations to guard such secrets,
though in the breast of an attorney.
29
Strictly speaking, the Annesley court did not create any exception to the
attorney-client privilege, as this passage shows. Rather, it held that communica-
tions were confidential only if they were made in the pursuit of legal advice.
30
The focus, therefore, must be upon the content of the communication, and the
judges must know just what was said before they can determine whether it was
"necessary" to the legal advice or not. There was no examination of the client's
subjective purpose to determine if it was criminal or fraudulent.
The Annesley approach to communications in furtherance of civil fraud (as
opposed to crime) was dominant for a very long time. The courts came only
hesitantly to the idea that the disclosure of a communication that met all the
conditions for privilege could be compelled because of the client's subjective pur-
pose in making it.
B. From Annesley to Cox
The history of the crime-fraud exception in the century and a half after
Annesley cannot be reduced to a single line of development. Two generalizations
28. Id. at 1240.
29. Id. at 1239.
30. Plaintiff's arguments on this point went far beyond what the court would accept. Plaintiff
suggested that the Earl's remarks should be disclosed because the privilege only applies when legal
advice is sought with respect to a pending action, and no action concerning the title to the estate had
been filed when the Earl retained Giffard to prosecute James. Harward went so far as to argue that it
could not be "foreseen that the title to the estate would ever come in question." Id. at 1232. Also,
these conversations took place in part before the formal retainer. Id. at 1227-28. Mr. Baron Daw-
son, in particular, rejected this view of when the privilege attaches. Id. at 1243-44. Dawson was
also careful to point out that the privilege protects all communications that the client reasonably
thinks necessary to his or her cause, whether they prove to have any legal relevance or not. Id.
The court's sensible resolution of these points did not prevent opponents of the privilege from
often successfully asserting in the succeeding 70 years that the privilege only attaches when counsel
is consulted with respect to a pending cause. Compare Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.
1833); Cromack v. Heathcote, 129 Eng. Rep. 857 (C.P. 1820); Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89
(1831), all holding that the privilege does attach, with Williams v. Mudie, 171 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Nisi
Prius 1824); Wadsworth v. Hamshaw, 129 Eng. Rep. 858, 858 n.(a) (1819), holding that the privilege
did not attach because no cause was pending at the time of the consultation. This curious fact
reinforces the impression that Annesley was largely forgotten in later years.
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can be made, however. First, the exception applied only to crimes mala in se.3 1
31. The limitation of the exception to crimes mald in se is explicit in an influential statement of
the exception in 1791:
Where the original Ground of Communication is Malum in se, as if he be consulted on an
Intention to commit a Forgery, or Perury, this can never be included within the Compass
of professional confidence: being equally contrary to his Duty in his Profession, his Duty
as a Citizen, and as a Man: but if such offence as Forgery, for example, committed without
his being privy, comes to his knowledge in the course of confidential transactions with his
Client, in the way of business, he shall not be compelled to assist in proving it.
1 J. GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 277-78 (London 1791) (Baron Gilbert died in 1727; the 1777
edition of his treatise, the fourth, does not include this passage). It is difficult to understand just
what Baron Gilbert and those who followed him meant by malum in se. In fact, it is difficult to
ascribe any fixed meaning to the term malum in se and to the often contrasted term malum prohib-
itum for any historical period, and for centuries the best authorities have deplored the use of the two
terms. They are not fully naturalized common-law categories, as evidenced by the lack of any Eng-
lish equivalent. The distinction between them is drawn differently depending upon the purpose for
which it is made, and the terms are ill-chosen for the ethical distinction they purport to make. The
essential idea, of course, is that some actions are "inherently and essentially evil, that is, immoral in
[their] nature and injurious in [their] consequences, without any regard to the fact of [their] being
noticed or punished by the law of the state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 1979). Such
actions are mala in se, whereas mere violations of positive law are malaprohibita. The application of
the terms, never very precise, has changed inconsistently throughout history with changes in the
predominant purpose for making the distinction.
The distinction may have originated in ecclesiastical law; if a priest committed an offense ma-
lum in se he could be unfrocked. W. LA FAvE & A. Sco'r, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 6
n.24 (1972). But to common lawyers and constitutional theorists from the later Middle Ages
through the 17th century the distinction mattered because it supposedly marked the limits of the
king's prerogative to suspend or dispense with a criminal statute. See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIs-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 218 (1924). This distinction led one 15th century judge to describe the
obstruction of the public highway as an offense malum in se, by which he meant that the king could
not license the creation of such a nuisance by his power of dispensation. Y.B. Mich. 11 Hen. 7, ff.
11, 12, pl. 35 (1496). In 1674, however, Chief Justice Vaughan denied the validity of such a conclu-
sion and declared that the king's dispensing power did not extend to all offenses mala prohibita
because the king might not bar a person who has suffered some particular injury as a result of
another's violation of a penal statute from bringing a prosecution thereunder. Thomas v. Sorrell,
124 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.P. 1674). For example, the king could not suspend a statute forbidding the
sale of adulterated wine, although such a sale is malum prohibitum, or one forbidding maintenance
(which is just in a just cause), but could suspend a statute requiring that wine sellers be licensed.
Vaughan also pointed out that not all statutory felonies are mala in se (for example, private coining),
and neither is every offense at common law. In effect, Vaughan denied the usefulness of the distinc-
tion to the problem at hand, saying that "[a]ll penal laws, when made, and in force, are equally
necessary, and in things necessary there is no gradation of more or less necessary." Thomas, 124
Eng. Rep. at 1106. It is interesting that a definition of mala in se nearly contemporaneous with Cox,
and much cited to this day, includes all felonies. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 324
(1873). Vaughan was obviously correct because the penalty that the legislature assigns to a criminal
statute is not a certain indicator of the wrongfulness of its breach in a moral sense.
Despite Vaughan's cogent opinion, Blackstone maintained the validity of the distinction in the
abstract, identifying mala in se with "actions that are naturally and intrinsically. . . wrong," 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54 (without clearly deriving such wrongfulness from divine law, id.
at *57, as Vaughan did), and malaprohibita with "things in themselves indifferent." Id. at *55. The
legislature is without power to make actions that are male in se lawful, but derives its authority to
punish mala prohibita from the social contract. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *8.
Despite Blackstone's pronouncements, in 1822 one judge of the King's Bench denounced the
distinction. The case was an action by a printer for labor and materials. He was nonsuited (and the
rule was made absolute) because he neglected to put his name and address upon the pamphlet
printed for the defendant, in accordance with statute:
The distinction between mala prohibita and mala in se has been long since exploded. It
was not founded upon any sound principle, for it is equally unfit, that a man should be
allowed to take advantage of what the law says he ought not to do, whether the thing be
prohibited, because it is against good morals, or whether it be prohibited, because it is
against the interest of the State. The object of [the statute] was to provide the most effec-
tual means of discovering the authors of every publication, in order that they might be
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Confidential communications in furtherance of fraud upon creditors, for exam-
ple, were protected. Second, in the few cases in which the court ordered an
attorney to testify about a client's civil frauds, the analysis, as in Annesley, was
always that the lawyer was not acting as an attorney with respect to the particu-
lar communication; hence, it was not confidential. The case of an attorney who
is a client's partner in fraud is merely a special case of this general rule. In cases
of civil fraud, the theory of an exception to the attorney-client privilege simply
was not used.
The limitation of the exception to crimes can be abundantly illustrated; in
fact, the party seeking to compel the attorney's testimony did not, in many cases
of civil fraud, even refer to the exception in support of his or her position.
32
made answerable for the contents. . . . There is no legal contract on which an action can
be founded, inasmuch as the thing was done in direct violation of the law.
Bensley v. Bignold, 106 Eng. Rep. 1214, 1216 (K.B. 1822) (Best, J.). This conclusion is not, of
course, consonant with modem contract law-precisely because the printer's omission, though in
violation of a penal statute, was not morally blameworthy and did not injure the defendant. This
fact nicely suggests why the courts have continued occasionally to use the terms malum in se and
malum prohibitum to this day, despite Vaughan's and Best's strictures. See, e.g., Morisette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (Actual intent is a necessary element of the crime of converting federal
property.). The degree of moral blameworthiness of an action in violation of a penal statute is
relevant in such contexts as finding involuntary manslaughter when death resulted from the defend-
ant's violation of a penal statute, holding a principal liable for the criminal actions of his or her
agent, and determining whether the legislature intended to make scienter or specific intent an ele-
ment in a criminal offense. Compare R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 880 (3d ed. 1982)
(distinction between acts mala in se and mala prohibita is real and essential to this day) with G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 6.2-6.6 (1978) (avoids all "artificial words of the law"
as analytical categories for dealing with intent and blameworthiness).
32. Two pre-Annesley cases exist in which attorneys were protected from testifying, although
the modem doctrine of attorney-client privilege would have held that the crime-fraud exception
applied. See Anonymus [sic], 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1693); Anonymous, 91 Eng. Rep. 1390 (K.B.
1699). Their facts and holdings are less than clear, but both cases concern illegal agreements for the
purchase of the office of under-sheriff.
In Robson v. Kemp, 170 Eng. Rep. 735 (Nisi Prius 1803), Lord Ellenborough held that when a
bankrupt debtor had transferred a ship to his son for a "warrant of attorney," the debtor's attorney
could not be called to prove the subsequent destruction of the warrant, a fraudulent act, in his
presence. Query whether the doing of a fraudulent act in an attorney's presence counted as a "com-
munication" at any period and whether it was open to the court to hold that the lawyer did not
witness such an act in his capacity as an attorney. Professor Hazard views Lord Ellenborough's
decisions on privilege as somewhat aberrational. See Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1061, 1081 (1978); see, e.g., Gainsford v. Grammar, 170
Eng. Rep. 1063 (K.B. 1809) (communications between attorney and client privileged although attor-
ney was clearly acting merely as a business agent). Other cases of the period, however, were in
complete agreement with respect to compelled attorney testimony about fraudulent conveyances.
See, eg., Hyde v. M. (Ir. M.R. 1827) (unreported decision), cited in Scott v. Dunbar, I MOLLOY'S
REPORTS OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY IN IRELAND 442, 450 note c (H.C. Ch. Div. 1828);
Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833) (fraudulent concealment of insolvency).
The contemporaneous American cases concerning fraudulent conveyances followed Lord Ellen-
borough's view. See Clay v. Williams, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 105 (1811) (confession of judgment on
fictitious indebtedness); Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 273 (1814) (fraudulent conveyance of
slaves previously delivered by parol gift; peculiar because the attorney sought to use his knowledge
of the conveyance for his own benefit as his client's creditor); Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89
(1831) (Shaw, C.J.) (fraudulent conveyance while grantor was "in failing circumstances"); Coveney
v. Tannahill, 1 Hill 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (fraudulent alteration of an account stated; court im-
pliedly concluded that such alteration is not malum in se).
The only American ease before 1884 which implied that the exception may be applicable to civil
fraud is Higbee v. Dresser, 103 Mass. 523 (1870). In Higbee, however, the attorney's testimony was




Only one pre-1884 case applied the exception to civil wrongdoing. In Russell v.
Jackson 3 3 an attorney was compelled to testify to a deceased testator's intention
that a legacy, apparently absolute, was really upon a secret trust for the estab-
lishment of a Socialist school in accordance with the principles of Robert
Owen.3 4 Apparently the beneficiaries denied that the legacy was upon a trust,
whereas the next-of-kin desired to prove the trust and then have it declared void
as illegal because it was inimical to the Christian religion.
The court held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply in a will
contest-not because the testator was dead but because "[tihe disclosure in such
cases can affect no right or interest of the client."' 35 The court went on, how-
ever, to identify the client's supposedly illegal purpose as fraudulent:
Where a solicitor is party to a fraud no privilege attaches to the com-
munications with him upon the subject because the contriving of a
fraud is no part of his duty as solicitor; and I think it can as little be
said that it is part of the duty of a solicitor to advise his client as to the
means of evading the law.
36
Thus the privilege was overcome because the court determined the ultimate is-
sue in the case-the illegality of a bequest to found a Socialist school-before
any evidence had been taken, as was ultimately required, on the relationship of
Socialist to Christian principles. 37 This decision could be viewed as a striking
anticipation of the workings of the fraud exception in its twentieth century form,
but it is hard not to see it as an ideological deformation.
Russell aside, however, the limitation of the exception to crimes was so well
established that even a judge who disapproved of it as a cloak for fraud felt
himself bound by it. Bank of Utica v. Mersereau38 concerned partners who, in
fraud of their other legitimate creditors, confessed judgment to a friendly credi-
tor, the Bank of Utica, in an amount greater than that actually owed. This
judgment was intended also to secure later advances, which were not actually
made. The Bank sued upon the judgment, and certain members of the partner-
ship called their attorney to testify that the transaction was fraudulent and collu-
sive. Other members, however, refused to waive the privilege. Chancellor
Walworth held that the attorney's testimony was inadmissible:
[I]t appears that the whole circumstances which [the attorney] was
called upon to disclose. . . were conversations of his clients in refer-
ence to the subject of his professional employment; which conversa-
tions it is wholly improbable they would have held with him if they
had not been under the supposed seal of professional confidence. ...
[W]here the attorney is professionally employed, any communication
made to him, by his client, with reference to the object or the subject of
such employment, is under the seal of professional confidence, and is
33. 68 Eng. Rep. 558 (Ch. 1851).
34. Id. at 559.
35. Id. at 560.
36. Id.
37. See Russell v. Jackson, 68 Eng. Rep. 900 (Ch. 1852) (reference to master).
38. 3 Barb. Ch. 528 (N.Y. 1848).
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entitled to protection as a privileged communication. Such appears to
be now the settled rule of the courts of England .... 39
The Chancellor went on to deplore his own ruling:
The seal of professional confidence I believe has never been held
to cover a communication made to an attorney to obtain professional
advice or assistance as to the commission of a felony or other crime
which was malum in se. The opinion of Chief Baron Gilbert certainly
was that the privilege of attorney and counsel did not extend to such
cases. . . . And as no one is entitled to the advice or assistance of
counsel, or of an attorney, to enable him to do an illegal act, if the
question had arisen for the first time in this case, I should have no
hesitation in deciding that the communications made by Hoffman &
Mersereau to their attorney were not privileged; because they were
made for the purpose of getting his professional assistance in the perpe-
tration of a fraud upon their creditors. It is as contrary to the duty of
an attorney. . . to aid his client. . . in the perpetration of a fraud, or
in the violation of any law of the state, as it is to aid him in the com-
mission of a felony; although the moral turpitude of the act may be
much greater in the one case than in the other. I can therefore see no
good reason for extending the principle of privileged communications
to the first class of cases and not to the last. The practice, however,
appears to have been otherwise for more than a century and a half; and
I do not now feel authorized to adopt a new rule on the subject.40
The mostly English precedents from which Chancellor Walworth drew his set-
tled rule were overruled after another generation,4 1 but until they were, no
American court felt itself authorized to depart from them.
The courts, however, could compel an attorney's testimony about a client's
civil fraud by determining that the client was not seeking legal advice or-what
is essentially the same thing-that the lawyer was not acting in the role of attor-
ney. Such a procedure was not strictly speaking an invocation of any exception
to the privilege and the courts did not characterize it as such. Cobden v. Ken-
drick 42 is the leading and only unambiguous example.43 Cobden was an action
39. Id. at 595.
40. Id. at 598. For a discussion of the distinctions between mala in se and mala prohibitum, see
supra note 31.
41. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
42. 100 Eng. Rep. 1102 (K.B. 1791).
43. Reynell v. Sprye, 50 Eng. Rep. 501 (M.R. 1846), was an action to rescind the sale of an
interest in land, title to which was then in litigation, as having been fraudulently induced by defend-
ant, who got his solicitor to misrepresent the legal difficulties of recovering the property. In fact,
defendant sent his attorney a rough sketch of the letter that he desired to be sent to Reynell, the
petitioner. The court held that Reynell was entitled to see Sprye's draft letter: "I have no doubt that
this is not a letter written in professional confidence for the purpose of obtaining the advantage of
professional assistance; for Sprye, having a particular purpose in view, makes this gentleman his tool,
and not his adviser." Id. at 503. It is not clear why the court characterized the solicitor as a mere
"tool," rather than as Reynell's partner in fraud, which he seems to have been (although there was
no allegation of personal benefit).
The court in Bramwell v. Lucas, 107 Eng. Rep. 560 (K.B. 1824), required an attorney to testify
about his client's inquiry whether he might attend a meeting of his creditors without fear of arrest
for debt. The attorney responded that the client could not and went alone to the meeting to arrange
a safe-conduct for the debtor. The court remarked that "[i]t can hardly be supposed, that a man
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at law to recover money that the plaintiff had paid to the holder of his promis-
sory note. After plaintiff had confessed judgment, defendant boasted to his at-
torney "that he had only given 10 £ in cash, and his promissory note for it; and
that he knew it was a lottery transaction." 44 The implication, presumably, is
that the defendant had not given legal consideration for the note.
The Cobden court held that the attorney must testify.45 The client's dam-
aging admission to his attorney was not made in the course of instructing him
how to proceed. Rather, "what was said by the client was in exultation to his
attorney for having before deceived him as well as his adversary .. "46
The client's remark in Cobden is analogous to the Earl of A.nglesea's im-
plied admission that James was the true heir to the earldom and that the Earl
must either hang him or settle with him.47 However, in Cobden the client made
his remark after his action had been settled, although final judgment had not
been entered.48 It was arguably an admission of past wrongdoing, which cus-
tomarily has been regarded as privileged. Nonetheless, the decision is obviously
correct because Kendrick did not admit his fraud for the purpose of obtaining
legal counsel, but rather for the purpose of boasting. A confidence was certainly
intended, but not a professional confidence.
In keeping with this principle, the courts began to recognize that an attor-
ney who actually assisted a client in perpetrating a civil fraud for the attorney's
own benefit could be compelled to testify.4 9 No cases, however, actually found
such participation. Such an attorney would be "acting for himself, though he
might also be employed for another"50 and might be compelled to testify in the
could ask, as a matter of law, whether he would be free from arrest whilst attending a voluntary
meeting of creditors; but he might well ask, as a matter of fact. . . whether any arrangement had
been made with the creditors to prevent an arrest. ... Id. at 561-62. To the modem reader, not
conversant with debtor-creditor law of the early 19th century, the distinction made by the court is
not self-evident, and it is not clear that the client committed any fraudulent act. The case illustrates,
however, the instinctive tendency of early courts, when they desired to hear an attorney's testimony,
to redefine the nature of the client communication rather than to find an exception to the privilege.
44. Cobden, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1103.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
48. Cobden, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1102-03.
49. For example, in Dudley v. Beck, 3 Wis. 274 (1854), a mortgage foreclosure action in which
the defense was the charging of usurious interest, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered the lender's
attorney to answer interrogatories attempting to establish that the attorney kicked back to the lender
a substantial portion of the-sum that the attorney charged the borrower, ostensibly for preparing the
loan documents. Id. at 278-79. The opinion did not discuss whether the borrower had made, or was
required to make, any preliminary showing that the kickback arrangement actually existed. The
court said:
If the witness obtained the loan for the defendant from Dudley, the mortgagee, in pursu-
ance of the agreement mentioned in the interrogatory, he pretended to act as the attorney
of the former, while the principal part of the money which the defendant paid him for his
services, went to the mortgagee. It was an act done by the attorney and client in pursuance
of an agreement entered into between them, and not a communication from the latter to
the former.
Id. at 286.
50. Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 621 (Ch. 1833).
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attorney's role asparticeps criminis.51 An 1850 dictum of Vice Chancellor Cran-
worth elaborates upon the reason:
[I]t is not accurate to speak of cases of fraud contrived by the client
and solicitor in concert together, as cases of exception to the general
rule. They are cases not coming within the rule itself, for the rule does
not apply to all which passes between a client and his solicitor, but
only to what passes between them in professional confidence; and no
Court can permit it to be said that the contriving of a fraud can form
any part of the professional occupation of an attorney or solicitor.52
Nothing in this statement seems to require that the attorney receive any benefit
other than a fee from the fraud.
As late as 1863, however, Chancery found it impossible to compel a solici-
tor to testify concerning a client's affairs when the client carried out a fraud with
the solicitor's assistance but without the solicitor's knowledge. In Chariton v.
Coombes,53 defendant was a widow who would cease to receive benefits under a
trust established by her late husband if she remarried without the trustees' con-
sent. She secretly remarried and then petitioned Chancery for an order compel-
ling the trustees' consent, representing herself as still unmarried. This action,
which apparently failed, was in fraud of her children's rights under the trust.54
In a later action by the trustees against her estate to recover sums improperly
paid to her on the supposition that she was still unmarried, the trustees sought
to examine her solicitor's files. The Vice Chancellor said:
[T]here was no allegation in the bill connecting the solicitor who
claims the privilege with the fraud in respect of which relief is sought
... . The bill, no doubt, says that the client of the solicitor commit-
ted a fraud; but in order to take the case out of the rule of privilege,
there must be some specific charge in the bill connecting the solicitor
with the fraud. . . . There is no particular charge in the bill as to
those letters . . .55
Thus, for the privilege to be overcome, the court required both that the solicitor
have been a conscious participant in the client's fraud and that the documents
sought have been instrumentalities of fraud. Charlton therefore remains a great
distance from the modern conception that the client's secret improper purpose
opens all communications between the client and his or her attorney to judicial
scrutiny.
II. REGINA V. Cox: THE EXCEPTION TAKES SHAPE
Regina v. Cox 56 was the first case in which a court held unequivocally that
there is no privilege when a client consults an attorney for the purpose of com-
mitting a crime or fraud, without revealing such purpose. Cox was a criminal
51. This term means "accomplice in crime."
52. Follett v. Jefferyes, 61 Eng. Rep. 1, 6 (Ch. 1850).
53. 32 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 284 (1863).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 286.
56. 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884).
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prosecution for a conveyance in fraud of creditors,5 7 but the facts are indistin-
guishable from any civil fraud, and the decision has always been understood as
applying equally to civil and criminal cases. 58 Like most seminal decisions in
the common-law courts, Cox gathered what support it could from anticipations
in dicta and claimed to state the true rule implicit in former decisions. The ten
judges in Cox acknowledged, however, that "we differ from one decision of the
full Court of Common Pleas, and from two decisions at Nisi Prius"'5 9 on facts
difficult to distinguish.
One of the defendants in Cox, Railton, consented to a judgment against
him for libel. The judgment was for a nominal amount, but carried with it sub-
stantial costs. 60 A bill of sale that purported to convey Railton's stock to de-
fendant Cox before the taxation of costs frustrated plaintiff's attempt to satisfy
the judgment out of the stock. 61 Cox was not, however, a bona fide purchaser
because he was Railton's (secret) partner in the newspaper business. Cox and
Railton were charged with preparing and fraudulently back-dating a memoran-
dum dissolving the partnership.
62
At the trial, their solicitor was permitted to testify to his conversation with
Railton and Cox, which occurred after costs had been assessed against the for-
mer. 63 He had told his clients that only a bona fide sale would prevent the
property from being seized under an execution and that a sale by Railton to Cox
would not pass muster because of the partnership. Railton asked, "Does anyone
know of the partnership except you and ourselves?" 64 The solicitor answered,
"No, not that I am aware of, only my clerks."' 65 This conversation presumably
was offered as evidence that the partnership was still in existence after the date
of the supposed dissolution.
The judges upheld the admission of this testimony. The heart of their rea-
soning is notably ingenious:
In order that the rule may apply there must be both professional confi-
dence and professional employment, but if the client has a criminal
object in view in his communications with his solicitor one of these
57. The indictment was for violation of 13 Eliz. ch. 5, §§ 1-3 (1570), which carried a penalty of
six months' imprisonment. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. at 154.
58. See, eg., Williams v. Quebrada Ry., Land & Copper Co., [1895] 2 Ch. 751; Matthews v.
Hoagland, 48 N.J. Eq. 455, 21 A. 1054 (Ch. 1891); Hamil & Co. v. England, 50 Mo. App. 338, 346-
47 (1892).
59. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. at 175. They were apparently referring to Cromack v. Heathcote, 129 Eng.
Rep. 857 (C.P. 1820); Robson v. Kemp, 170 Eng. Rep. 735 (Nisi Prius 1803); and Doe v. Harris, 172
Eng. Rep. 1113 (Nisi Prius 1833). In Cromack an attorney refused to assist plaintiff in drawing an
assignment of certain property to his son because he knew that execution had already issued against
plaintiff. Plaintiff obtained the assistance of another solicitor. The first attorney was not compelled
to testify as to his conversations with plaintiff. The only grounds adduced by defendant for compel-
ling the solicitor's testimony were that plaintiff did not consult the solicitor in connection with any
cause and that the solicitor refused the employment.
60. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. at 155.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 155-56.
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elements must necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire
with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed, the
client does not consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot be
the solicitor's business to further any criminal object. If the client does
not avow his object he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts,
which is the foundation of the supposed confidence, does not exist.
66
The court here made a bold play upon the word "confidence." Vice Chan-
cellor Cranworth, among others, previously had said that there is no privilege
except for "what passes between [client and solicitor] in professional confi-
dence." 67 This statement is entirely consistent with the Annesley approach:
68
there can be no professional confidence when the attorney is either invited to
participate in a fraud, which is no part of the attorney's professional role, or
when the attorney is told some fact not needed to perform a professional
function.
The Cox court, however, for the first time conceived that the client has a
role to play. No professional confidence existed because the clients failed to take
the attorney into their confidence. Because the privilege is intended to make
perfect frankness possible, there is no privilege unless the client is perfectly
frank. The court equated the technical requirement of "confidentiality," which
both before and since the Cox decision has meant that no one but the client and
his or her attorney is privy to the communication, with the meaning of the word
in ordinary speech. The crime-fraud exception in its modern form, with its fo-
cus on the client's intention, was born of this rhetorical figure.
But the court's clever antithesis between "conspiring" with the attorney
and "deceiving" the attorney is an inadequate justification for the exception even
on the facts of Cox. There was no evidence before the court to show that
Railton had any intention of fraudulently conveying his property at the time he
consulted his solicitor. In fact, defendants' intention to prepare fraudulent arti-
cles of dissolution may have been formed as a result of the solicitor's advice.
Even if the formation of a secret partnership could be evidence of a disposition
to future fraud on the part of defendants, (1) such action was not itself fraudu-
lent; (2) the existence of the partnership, far from facilitating the fraudulent
conveyance, was an obstacle to it; and (3) the decision did not turn on any such
finding.
69
Thus, there is a middle case, not recognized by the court, between conspir-
ing with an attorney and deceiving an attorney. That is the case in which the
66. Id. at 168.
67. Follette v. Jefferyes, 61 Eng. Rep. 1, 6 (Ch. 1850).
68. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
69. Defendants' counsel made this very point: "There was nothing to shew the defendants had
any fraud in view when they went to, or, indeed, when they came away from, the solicitor. .. ."
Cox, 14 Q.B.D. at 162. Curiously, this question was discussed in a recent case, Butler v. Board of
Trade, [1971] 1 Ch. 680, in which the court read Cox as finding that Railton and Cox had formed a
fraudulent intent before consulting their solicitor. Id. at 684. Because the holding in Butler was that
the document in question was not privileged because it had been made public, it is not clear whether




client discovers from an attorney that the client's objective cannot be legally
attained. As a result, the client decides to commit a fraud, aided by the attor-
ney's unwitting advice. Whether or not Cox was such a case, the exception has
been applied to such cases since Cox. 70 The court's formulation of the excep-
tion-that it applies when "the accused person may have consulted his legal
adviser. . . before the commission of the crime for the purpose of being guided
or helped in committing it"7 1--is therefore not strictly accurate. The client's
purpose when he or she consults an attorney may be irrelevant. The only rele-
vant question may be: Did the client commit a fraud after consulting the
attorney?
Implicit in this question are all the difficulties that bedevil modern courts in
attempting to apply the exception. Whether the client in fact committed a fraud
is commonly the ultimate issue in the case. The best evidence of fraud (perhaps
the only evidence) may be the attorney-client communication. If the availability
of the privilege further depends on whether the client abused his or her attor-
ney's counsel in perpetrating the fraud, the court must know what the attorney
advised the client before it can determine whether the privilege applies.
The Queen's Bench saw some of these problems in the maling, but de-
clined, no doubt wisely, to lay down any rule:
We were greatly pressed with the argument that, speaking practically,
the admission of any such exception to the privilege of legal advisers as
that it is not to extend to communications made in furtherance of any
criminal or fraudulent purpose would greatly diminish the value of
that privilege. The privilege must, it was argued, be violated in order
to ascertain whether it exists. The secret must be told in order to see
whether it ought to be kept. We were earnestly pressed to lay down
some rule as to the manner in which this consequence should be
avoided. The only thing which we feel authorized to say upon this
matter is, that in each particular case the Court must determine upon
the facts actually given in evidence or proposed to be given in evidence,
whether it seems probable that the accused person may have consulted
his legal adviser. . . before the commission of the crime for the pur-
pose of being guided or helped in committing it.72
The rule of Regina v. Cox was rapidly adopted in the United States. The
case was cited as early as 1886 in Texas 73 and was discussed extensively by the
New Jersey Court of Chancery in 1891. 74 Not surprisingly, certain early cases
70. See, eg., Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 340 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1960) (insured
lied to his second attorney about the circumstances of a fire after his first attorney told him he had no
claim under his policy); Gebhardt v. United Rys., 220 S.W. 677 (Mo. 1920) (plaintiff admitted to
her first attorney that she was not on a trolley when it was derailed, contrary to her later testimony);
In re Stein, 1 N.J. 228, 62 A.2d 801 (1949) (a couple sought to obtain a divorce by pejury after their
first attorney explained that they had no legal grounds).
71. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. at 175.
72. Id.
73. Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 616-17, 3 S.W. 468, 471-72 (1886) (Defendant murdered
a man who had insulted his mother and sisters after learning from his attorney of the existence of a
statute reducing the penalty in such cases from murder to manslaughter.).
74. Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N.J. Eq. 455, 467-70, 21 A. 1054, 1059-60 (Ch. 1891) (dictum).
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that relied upon the newly stated rule would have fit comfortably within older
modes of analysis.
7 5
By 1891 the United States Supreme Court had approved the Cox rule, in-
troducing, however, a supposed limitation that is probably a dead letter today.
Alexander v. United States7 6 concerned the murder of an Indian, the business
partner of defendant, in Indian territory. After the victim disappeared, Alexan-
der consulted his attorney, saying that his partner had run off with partnership
funds and inquiring whether he could recover his share by keeping certain hor-
ses belonging to the partnership. The attorney's testimony was admitted to im-
peach certain other statements of defendant about his partner's disappearance.
The Supreme Court held that admitting the testimony was error,7 7 noting that
the conversation was innocent on its face and occurred after the supposed com-
mission of the crime for which Alexander was being tried. The conversation
could only be viewed as in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the victim by
assuming the very thing in issue: that Alexander murdered his partner for
gain.
7 8
This reasoning seems sound enough, although it invites an analysis, which
the Court did not make, of the state of the government's case at the time the
attorney's testimony was offered. 79 The Court further stated, essentially without
explanation, that the "rule announced in [Cox ] should be limited to cases where
the party is tried for the crime in furtherance of which the communication was
made."' 80 The communication was obviously not in furtherance of the murder
and therefore was inadmissible. The Court provided no justification for this lim-
itation, which seems to be mere dictum. The limitation has never been squarely
overruled, but in several cases the federal courts have disregarded it; there ap-
pear to be none in which it has been followed.8 1
The subsequent development of the future crime or fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege has taken place almost entirely in the United States.
82
75. See, eg., State v. Faulkner, 175 Mo. 546, 75 S.W. 116 (1903) (counsel was acting as go-
between in a bribery scheme); Hamil & Co. v. England, 50 Mo. App. 338 (1892) (counsel was appar-
ently party to the fraud); cf. State v. Stone, 65 N.H. 124, 18 A. 654 (1889) (murder threats made in
attorney's presence admissible; Cox not cited).
76. 138 U.S. 353 (1891).
77. Id. at 360.
78. Id.
79. The Court did not note whether the attorney's evidence formed part of the prosecution's
case-in-chief or whether it was offered in rebuttal. If the latter (as seems likely because it was offered
to impeach), there was no problem of circularity of proof such as the court imagined the prosecution
had already introduced ample independent evidence of the murder.
80. Alexander, 138 U.S. at 360.
81. See In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 554 n. 11(8th Cir. 1980); In re Sawyer's Petition,
229 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226,
230-31 (D.D.C. 1948). In Berkley, however, the court held that the communications were in fur-
therance of the same fraud for which defendant was being tried; in Sawyer's Petition, the court found
that the nonadmission of the disputed testimony was harmless error. Thus the stated refusal of both
courts to follow theAlexander limitation was essentially dictum. The court in Harrison, on the other
hand, interpreted the holding in Alexander as turning on the fact that the murder had already been
committed when the defendant consulted his attorney and therefore disregarded the Alexander limi-
tation as dictum.
82. The paucity of cases in Great Britain after Regina v. Cox is notable, even considering the
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This development is best traced by turning attention to the difficult issues raised
by the exception and treating them individually.
III. WHAT SHOWING OF FRAUDULENT INTENT is NECESSARY TO
DISSOLVE THE PRIVILEGE?
As previously suggested, the new formulation of the exception led to an
emphasis on whether the client consulted an attorney in furtherance of a scheme
of fraud.8 3 In the great majority of instances, the commission of a crime or
fraud is the ultimate issue in the case, and the attorney-client communication is
relevant precisely as evidence of such commission. A mere allegation of fraud
should not be enough to overcome the privilege, however. It is desirable to
avoid the circularity of relying upon the confidential communication itself to
prove the client's fraudulent intent, which in turn serves as the necessary justifi-
cation for disclosure. This difficulty, anticipated by at least one court even
before Cox, 84 is central to the modern history of the crime-fraud exception.
More particularly, the courts are constantly confronted with the following
questions:
(1) What quantum of evidence is necessary to overcome the pre-
sumption in favor of the confidentiality of attorney-client com-
munications?
(2) Can the communication itself serve as the necessary evidence?
(3) If so, should the determination be made by the judge after an in
camera examination of the communication?
In recent years, the courts have lowered the evidentiary standard that the oppo-
nent of the privilege must meet to overcome the privilege85 and generally have
rejected any requirement that there be evidence of fraud independent of the con-
small number of reporting courts and the smaller volume of litigation. See In re Postlethwaite, 35
Ch. D. 722 (1887); In re Arnott, 60 L.T.R. (n.s.) 109 (Q.B. 1888); Williams v. Quebrada Ry., Land
& Copper Co., [1895] 2 Ch. 751; Regina v. Bullivant, 2 Q.B. 163 (C.A. 1900), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Bullivant v. Attorney-General, 1901 A.C. 196; O'Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 A.C. 581;
Butler v. Board of Trade, [1971J 1 Ch. 680. The contrast with the sophisticated elaboration of the
exception in the United States is astonishing.
One can only speculate that the division between solicitors and barristers, the small size and
social cohesiveness of the trial bar, and the fact that the criminal bar as a whole both prosecutes and
defends lead to an unwillingness to make one's case out of the mouth of opponent's counsel. Private
communication of Professor J. Christopher Levy, University of Calgary, Faculty of Law (September
1984). The contrast with the United States is most marked in the criminal area, where government
prosecutors have lately made a practice of calling the attorneys who represent the subjects of their
investigation before the grand jury. See infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy,
too, that the English Reports reveal no case of an attorney consciously conniving in his or her
client's fraud.
83. See supra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
84. In Higbee v. Dresser, 103 Mass. 523 (1870), the court stated:
A mere suggestion of fraud, in general terms, does not furnish sufficient ground for setting
aside so well known and salutary a rule as that which protects and privileges the communi-
cations of counsel and client. If the case disclosed anything having a tendency to show that
the witness was acting for himself as a party to the transaction, or that he was consulted in
aid of any intended fraud, or that his advice was asked for any dishonest purpose, the
matter would have raised a more serious question.
Id. at 526.
85. See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
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fidential communication itself.8 6 They have attempted instead to reconcile the
competing claims of confidentiality and disclosure by in camera review of the
disputed evidence.
A. Must the Opponent of the Privilege Make Out a Prima Facie Case?
After an initial period of confusion, especially in England,8 7 the courts be-
gan to define the burden upon the opponent of the privilege as that of making
out a prima facie case of crime or fraud on the part of the person whose attorney
is asked to testify.88 Of course, the verbal formulas that courts adopted as the
test or standard to apply were often not especially revealing.8 9 However, it is
undoubtedly significant that American courts in recent years have explicitly
abandoned the prima facie test in favor of a lesser burden, sometimes character-
ized as "some foundation in fact." 90
The 1932 case of Clark v. United States 91 is commonly cited in support of
the prima facie test.92 Clark, a juror in a criminal trial for mail fraud, was found
86. See infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
87. The early case of In re Postlethwaite, 35 Ch. D. 722 (1887), can be read as holding, as an
alternative ground, that a mere allegation of breach of fiduciary duty dissolves the privilege. Wil-
liams v. Quebrada Ry., Land & Copper Co., [1895] 2 Ch. 751, seems to lend some support to this
position, although the sufficiency of a mere allegation to overcome the privilege is apparently left
open by Bullivant v. Attorney-General, 1901 A.C. 196, 201:
[I]n order to displace the prima facie right of silence by a witness who has been put in the
relation of professional confidence with his client, before that confidence can be broken you
must have some definite charge either by way of allegation or affidavit or what not. I do
not at present go into the modes by which that can be made out ....
Matters were somewhat clarified in O'Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 A.C. 581, 604 (Viscount Finlay):
If the communications to the solicitor were for the purpose of obtaining professional ad-
vice, there must be, in order to get rid of privilege, not merely an allegation that they were
made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud, but there must be
something to give colour to the charge. The statement must be made in clear and definite
terms, and there must further be some prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in
fact. . . .The Court will exercise its discretion. . . for the purpose of seeing whether the
charge is made honestly and with sufficient probability of its truth to make it right to
disallow the privilege of professional communications.
In its prolixity, this passage hardly lays down a single standard.
88. The exception, as it has been stated until now, requires that the communication be "in
furtherance of" crime or fraud; it would seem, therefore, that the prima facie case must relate to the
client's purpose in making the particular communication whose production is sought. Typically,
courts are less than analytically precise in relating the communication to the fraud. See infra notes
200-33 and accompanying text.
89. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984) (defining
the required showing as "a reasonable basis for believing that the objective was fraudulent"). The
court stated:
Other circuits have referred to the burden in terms of the need to make a prima facie
showing. . . . As a practical matter, there is little difference here between the two tests.
Both require that a prudent person have a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a crime or fraud, and that the communications were in further-
ance thereof.
Id. (citations omitted).
90. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
91. 289 U.S. 1 (1932).
92. See Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144-45 (4th Cir. 1967); Research Corp. v.
Gourmet's Delight Mushroom Co., 560 F. Supp. 811, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poenas Dated December 18, 1981, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. King,
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guilty of criminal contempt for answering questions falsely during her voir dire
examination. 93 Apparently it was her fixed purpose to get on the jury to vote for
acquittal.
Justice Cardozo found that other jurors' testimony about what occurred in
the jury room could be compelled despite the immemorial privilege of secrecy,
drawing an explicit analogy to the crime-fraud exception of the attorney-client
privilege.94 The privilege, he stated, is overcome when there is "a showing of a
prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that the light should be let in.,,9
5
In Clark not only had a prima facie case been established, but the juror's pejury
had been so abundantly proven by independent evidence that the admission of
evidence concerning discussions in the jury room would, if erroneous, have been
harmless. 96 The opinion thus provides little guidance as to the minimum quan-
tum of evidence necessary to overcome the privilege.
Equally influential was the case of United States v. Bob,97 in which the de-
fendant was charged with using the mails to defraud in the sale of worthless
mining stock. Bob's attorney was compelled to testify concerning Bob's connec-
tion with certain mining companies in the recent past, to defeat a claim that the
statute of limitations had run.98 The court held that the testimony of a co-
conspirator had already established a prima facie case against Bob and that the
privilege had thereby been overcome.99
Although certain courts continue to cite Bob and Clark with approval, 10°
others have explicitly criticized the prima facie requirement, saying that the use-
fulness of attorney testimony in establishing fraud justifies a lower burden. In a
1953 decision the burden was described as "evidence. . .giving color to the
charge." 10 1 Another opinion described the establishment of a prima facie case
as a "mechanical rule" that may be appropriate for jury trials but rejected it in
favor of "a substantial doubt as to whether or not the charges were true" stan-
dard for cases in which the judge has the option of in camera inspection.10 2 In
two recent cases the Colorado Supreme Court held that the opponent of the
privilege need establish only a "foundation in fact," characterized as an "inter-
536 F. Supp. 253, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1982); In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 Bankr. 993, 999 (D. Me. 1981);
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 624, 625 n.2 (D.D.C. 1980); Burlington
Inds. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40-41 (D. Md. 1974).
93. Clark, 289 U.S. at 6.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. (citing O'Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 A.C. 581).
96. Id. at 18.
97. 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939).
98. Id. at 39-40.
99. Id. at 40.
100. See, eg., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456
F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144-45 (4th Cir. 1967);
Buell v. Superior Court, 391 P.2d 919, 924, 96 Ariz. 62, 68 (1964).
101. Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953);
accord International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 182 (7M.D. Fla. 1973)
("colorable showing").
102. A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
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mediate burden of proof," because of the difficulty of establishing a prima facie
case of fraud at the discovery stage.
10 3
B. The Rejection of the "Independency" Test
So far we have assumed that some quantum of evidence, however defined, is
a prerequisite for the introduction of otherwise privileged evidence. No such
rule was made explicit, 1°4 however, until the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Shewfelt 105 in 1972. The rule has
since been rejected by other courts as an unwarranted obstruction.
10 6
The Shewfelt court upheld a conviction for multiple counts of mail
fraud.10 7 The trial court permitted defendant's attorney to testify as to commu-
nications clearly showing that defendant had instigated the scheme.108 The
court held that such testimony was properly admitted:
[B]efore the privileged status of these communications can be lifted,
the government must first establish a prima facie case of fraud indepen-
dently of the said communications. . . . Herein. . .prior to the testi-
mony of attorney Walton, the government had adduced substantial
evidence proving falsehoods in the complaints and mailings which
served as the bases of the charges brought against the appellants. 109
This statement of the prima facie rule promptly became known as the Shewfelt
or "independency" test. In the context of the facts of Shewfelt, the test seems to
be dictum. In Bob,110 cited as authority in Showfelt, IIl the court merely held
that a prima facie case must be first established before the privilege is
overthrown. 
112
Courts in later decisions have seized upon these deficiencies to attack
Shewfelt as essentially unsupported. 1 3 One court has remarked that "[i]n ap-
103. Bernard D. Morley, P.C. v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Colo. 1982) (records of
several clients seized in search of law office, upon warrant); Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26,
33 (Colo. 1982) (discovery in fraud and conspiracy suit against two attorneys and legal counsel
employed by these attorneys).
104. See, eg., Grummons v. Zollinger, 240 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1964), aff'd, 341 F,2d 464
(7th Cir. 1965) (documents whose contents were known through discovery held admissible at trial
on account of the crime-fraud exception although there was no evidence apart from the documents
to show that they were prepared in furtherance of fraud).
105. 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
106. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
107. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d at 837.
108. Id. at 840.
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
111. The court also cited Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1967), which
simply restated the prima facie rule.
112. Bob, 106 F.2d at 40.
113. In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 n.9 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. King, 536 F.
Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982). King is remarkable for allowing a prima facie case of fraud to be
established entirely on the basis of the ostensibly privileged communication, the content of which
was obtained from a concealed microphone on the person of the client's employee, who was cooper-
ating with the FBI! In this case, however, as in many others, the crime-fraud exception was cited as
an alternative ground for the holding. Id. at 261. Perhaps still more remarkable, the principal
ground was that the communication was not confidential because the attorney knew that the em-
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propriate cases the subpoenaed material itself may provide prima facie evidence
of a violation," 114 without explaining how one determines what is an appropri-
ate case.
Only one decision has provided any reasons for rejecting the independency
test. These reasons seem valid for a limited class of cases. Kockums Industries
Ltd. v. Salem Equipment, Inc. 115 was a patent infringement action. Defendant
claimed that plaintiff sold the device in question more than one year before filing
a patent application. Therefore, the patent was fraudulently obtained and
invalid, and the attempt to enforce it gave rise to counterclaims for unfair com-
petition and antitrust violations. 116 Defendant moved to compel discovery of
numerous documents prepared by plaintiff's attorneys relating both to the appli-
cation for the patent and to the commencement of the action at bar.
117
The court held that defendant had established a "prima facie case of techni-
cal fraud" on the Patent Office independent of any of the disputed documents.
818
Plaintiff sought to parlay this finding into a ground for discovery of attorney-
client communications after the issuance of the patent, claiming that the in-
fringement action was a further step in the same fraud or, alternatively, a "fraud
upon the court."' 1 9
The court found plaintiff's argument analytically unsatisfactory. A supe-
rior analysis would turn on the nature of the proof required to make out the
defendant's counterclaims and the documents' relevance to such proof. The
bringing of a patent infringement action in bad faith, with the knowledge that
the patent is invalid, and for the purpose of intimidating competitors, is an anti-
trust violation, as well as unfair competition. However, the presumption that
such actions are brought in good faith can be overcome only by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The best, and perhaps the only, evidence of the plaintiff's
good faith would be the communications with its attorney concerning the deci-
sion to bring the action. It is unrealistic to expect the defendant to meet its
burden independent of such communications, as a precondition for seeing
them.' 20 This fact constitutes an "extraordinary circumstance" of the sort re-
quired before the court will disregard the Shewfelt rule and examine the commu-
nications in camera.
ployee was cooperating with the government. Id. at 260. She did not, of course, know that the
employee was wired.
114. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wright, J.). This case concerned the
extension of the future crime or fraud exception to the qualified immunity from production of the
attorney's work product under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Judge Wright held that there is a further
requirement that a "valid relationship" must exist between the prima facie crime or fraud and the
work product. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 814-15. This requirement is in effect a revival of the
Alexander limitation, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text, and if Judge Wright is correct, it
is indeed difficult to see how the relationship between the fraud and the work product can be estab-
lished without an in camera examination of the latter.
115. 561 F. Supp. 168 (D. Or. 1983).
116. Id. at 171, 173.
117. Id. at 170.
118. Id. at 171.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 173-74 n.5.
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At the same time, the court carefully noted that the patent sued upon was
invalid because of the apparently deliberate concealment of relevant prior art. 12 1
This concealment strongly suggested that plaintiff knew or must have known
that it was suing on a void patent, which gave rise to an inference of bad faith.
Thus the court's review of the privileged communications was based on some-
thing more than defendant's bare allegation.
Kockums is representative of a class of cases in which one party's bad faith
is an element in the cause of action. Whether the party charged with bad faith
followed the advice of counsel is usually highly relevant.122 In Kockums the
plaintiff-in-counterclaim had the burden of showing bad faith by clear and con-
vincing evidence-a burden made immeasurably more difficult by the privilege.
An analogy may be drawn to cases (particularly federal civil rights claims
against public officials) in which good faith is an affirmative defense. It is famil-
iar law that the mere assertion of a good faith defense may waive the privilege as
to legal advice received because the nature of such advice is highly relevant to
one's state of mind. 123 Even when the mere assertion of a good faith defense
does not constitute a waiver, a party cannot expect to rely on the testimony of
his or her attorney at trial if the party has not made the privileged communica-
tions available at the discovery stage. 12 4 This analogy suggests the correctness
121. Id. at 174.
122. If a corporate client disregards its attorney's advice, an inference of bad faith arises. There
is some question whether this is a reason for affirming the privilege or denying it. The American Bar
Association (ABA) has stated that
the privilege is most necessary where the corporation has sought advice about a prospective
transaction, where counsel in good faith has stated his opinion that it is not lawful, but the
corporation has proceeded in total or partial disregard of counsel's advice. The ABA urges
that the cause of justice requires that counsel be free to state his opinion as fully and
forthrightly as possible without fear of later disclosure to persons who might attack the
transaction, and that without the cloak of the privilege counsel may be "required by tile
threat of future discovery to hedge or soften their opinions."
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971)
(quoting the ABA's amicus curiae brief).
123. See, eg., In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1315 n.20 (7th Cir. 1984) (dic-
tum); United States v. Exxon Corp., 94 F.R.D. 246 (D.D.C. 1981) (a defense of good faith compli-
ance with government regulations waives the privilege); Russell v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,
493 F. Supp. 456 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (plaintiffs put certain communications with their attorneys in
issue by seeking equitable relief from the statute of limitations); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581
(E.D. Wash. 1975) (in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), plaintiff was entitled to see commu-
nications from State attorney general to the prison superintendent when the latter claimed he acted
in good faith).
Obviously, one party does not waive the privilege because the other party puts his or her good
faith at issue by way of counterclaim or affirmative defense. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Drysdale
Sec. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendants in securities-fraud action denied discovery
of privileged communications although they might show that plaintiff did not in fact rely upon
defendant's allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Superior Court,
153 Cal. App. 3d 467, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1984) (counterclaim for bad-faith denial of insurance
coverage did not entitle defendant to examine communications between the insurer and its attorneys
with respect to the policy prior to its issuance). Thus it has been held that a party did not waive the
physician-patient privilege by a mere denial of allegations about his mental or physical condition.
Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3 (Colo. 1983) (en bane). But cf Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 120 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (dictum: "[Where] a plaintiff in a patent infringement
suit has put the validity of the patents directly in issue, he may have waived any claim of privilege.").
The Honeywell dictum seems plainly wrong.
124. See, eg., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 186 (M.D. Fla.
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of the Kockums approach when applied with due regard to difficulties of proof
and to the specific relevance of the communications sought.125
C. In Camera Review
Not surprisingly, courts have increasingly employed the device of in camera
inspection to sidestep the issue of what precise quantum of evidence is necessary
to overcome the privilege.126 It seems logical to say that in camera inspection,
which is a smaller intrusion upon the confidentiality of the attorney-client rela-
tionship than is public disclosure, should be permitted on the basis of a smaller
quantum of evidence of crime or fraud. Some courts, however, have endorsed
the substitution of inspection by the judge for the safeguard of requiring in-
dependent evidence of fraud. 127 When courts follow this procedure, the plaintiff
may first induce the court to read the defendant's confidential communications
on an unsupported charge of crime or fraud; the prima facie case needed to
justify their introduction into evidence is then constructed out of the communi-
cations themselves.
In camera inspection of ostensibly privileged documents is common on mo-
tions to quash grand jury subpoenas. In that context, the case for disclosure is
not necessarily based solely on the attorney-client communications. Rather, the
government may also submit affidavits and transcripts of grand jury testimony
ex parte, and government attorneys will argue for the applicability of the excep-
tion in chambers. As a result, the attorney and the client cannot meaningfully
dispute the court's finding that the government has established a prima facie
case of fraud.128 On occasion, this fact has led the client to reverse his or her
1973). The court found that plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing that certain adminis-
trative proceedings were a mere sham, but cautioned defendant that it might not rely at trial upon its
counsel's testimony that the proceedings were brought in good faith if it should refuse to waive the
privilege in discovery.
125. Certain language in Kockums suggests a slightly different analysis-namely, that the de-
fendant could make out a prima facie showing of unfair competition or antitrust violations if the
burden of proof were lowered from clear and convincing to a preponderance of the evidence. Kock-
urns, 561 F. Supp. at 173. The implication is that the independency test is inappropriate when a
prima facie case is more difficult than usual to establish for procedural reasons-in this case, because
the burden of proof of fraud is heavier than ordinary. See id. at 173 n.5.
126. The author is aware of no instance of in camera inspection before Williams v. Quebrada
Ry., Land & Copper Co., [1895] 2 Ch. 751, although the court described such inspection as an old
practice. The judge was careful to note, however, that he had made up his mind that the documents
should be produced before he inspected them; the purpose of the inspection, with defendant's per-
mission, was merely to limit the production order as far as possible.
127. The Colorado courts have strongly adopted this position. In A. v. District Court, 191 Colo.
10, 24, 550 P.2d 315, 325-26, cert denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1976), the court ruled that no showing
whatever was required to justify in camera inspection of client files subpoenaed by a grand jury from
an attorney; if the documents revealed some foundation in fact for the charge they might be admitted
into evidence before the grand jury. See also Bernard D. Morley, P.C. v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d
1215, 1221-22 (Colo. 1982) (foundation in fact may be established by in camera inspection of client
records seized in a search of the attorney's office); Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo.
1982) (discovery of attorney-client communications permitted in fraud and conspiracy suit against
two attorneys and legal counsel employed by these attorneys). But cf. Dura Corp. v. Milwaukee
Hydraulic Prods., Inc., 37 F.R.D. 470, 471 (E.D. Wis. 1965) (in camera inspection is "unwarranted
'prying'" when a sufficient showing of privilege has been made).
128. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1984) (attorney, not a
target of the investigation, was denied access to IRS agent's affidavit submitted to defeat privilege);
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usual position and demand that the court inspect the confidential communica-
tions or examine the attorney in camera, rather than rely solely on secret gov-
ernment evidence. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas)129 the trial court
ordered the production of the attorney's records solely on the basis of evidence
submitted ex parte. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that the district court had not abused its discretion by refusing to examine
such records in chambers:
[O]nce the trial judge has concluded that the privilege does not apply
because the government has made such a prima facie showing, the trial
court need only conduct an in camera inspection of the documents if
there is a possibility that some of them may fall outside the scope of
the exception to the privilege.
1 30
The Tenth Circuit's position is consistent with judicial hostility toward
"minitrials and preliminary showings" as a prerequisite for the enforcement of
grand jury subpoenas.1 31 Judge Skelly Wright has gone so far as to say that the
difficulty of in camera inspection itself justifies the imposition of a lower stan-
dard for overcoming the attorney-client privilege.
132
With no great exaggeration one may conclude that the courts, when super-
vising a grand jury, will examine attorney-client communications in camera if
necessary to overcome the privilege ("necessary" because the government has no
extrinsic evidence of fraud). Courts may refuse to do so, however, when such
examination is the only means by which the witness can vindicate the privilege
in the face of secret government affidavits.
Does the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings justify this hostile treat-
ment of the privilege? The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit has said that when the attorney-client privilege is overcome by secret grand
jury testimony and affidavits submitted ex parte, the privilege is not waived, but
may still be asserted at trial-at which time the prosecution may of course argue
In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) (government affidavit summarizing secret grand
jury testimony obtained under a grant of immunity); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 575 F.
Supp. 197, 200 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (client may not see the government's oral, in camera affidavit
without a showing of "particularized need"), aff'd, 154 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1979) (crime-fraud exception applicable to
work product privilege as well as attorney-client privilege); see also Weiner, Federal Grand Jury
Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal for Reform, 23 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 95, 106-07 (1985) (basing a
determination of crime or fraud on an ex parte government submission in camera undermines the
attorney-client relationship).
129. 723 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984).
130. Id. at 1467. The court here adverted to an important subsidiary function of in camera
inspection-the editing of documents to exclude material not coming within any exception to the
privilege. See, eg., In re Witness before Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1984) (exclusion of billing records to the extent they reveal the subject of consultation); In re
Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (dictum).
131. The quoted phrase appears in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (no prelimi-
nary showing of "reasonableness" required before grand jury may summon witness to give voice
exemplar).
132. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wright, J.). Judge Wright specifi-
cally rejected the necessity for "too precise or rigorous" a standard for the relationship between the
work product under subpoena and the prima facie violation, or for a "specific showing of the client's
intent in consulting the attorney." Id.
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for the applicability of the exception.1 33 The court, in fact, advanced this con-
clusion as a justification for allowing the privilege to be overcome by secret evi-
dence. The publication of the confidential communications to the grand jury
was appropriate so long as the communications did not thereby become auto-
matically admissible in court.
Apart from the question whether this solution illustrates an adequate un-
derstanding of the values served by the attorney-client privilege, 134- at least one
other court has denied that the privilege survives the disclosure of the confiden-
tial communications to the grand jury. In United States v. Dyer 135 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a subpoena compelling an
attorney to testify to his discussions with his client, a member of the New Orle-
ans Planning Commission. 136 Apparently as a result of these discussions the
attorney had returned $25,000 to a developer the next day with a letter explain-




[I]n the interest of judicial economy we pause to note that we find no
rational basis for concluding that the privilege is defeated for purpose
of grand jury testimony but nonetheless is resurrected at trial ...
When the confidence is broken the values their [sic] protection vindi-
cated would no longer weigh in the balance against the strong policy
supporting the right to every person's evidence. . . . Of course, if the
evidence at trial persuades the trial court that the earlier established
crime or fraud exception is in fact not established the privilege could
be recognized.
13 8
It is difficult to understand the court's final qualification. Perhaps the court
meant that when the attorney's testimony was admitted before the grand jury
the burden shifted to the defendant to show at trial that no prima facie case of
fraud or crime had been established. Ordinarily, of course, the burden is on the
proponent of the exception.
IV. THE GROWTH IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION INCREASES THE
REACH OF THE CRIME-FRAUD ExCEPTION
As the discussion above has illustrated, courts have broadened the crime-
fraud exception by steadily lowering the procedural threshold for its application.
The quantum of evidence required to trigger the exception has decreased, and
the confidential communication itself has been used to provide the necessary
133. In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 57 (7th Cir. 1980).
134. See infra notes 267-75 and accompanying text.
135. 722 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983).
136. Id. at 175, 179.
137. Id. at 176. The government's theory was that the return of the money was an obstruction of
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982); the letter counted as fabricated evidence, and the
client therefore consulted his attorney for a criminal purpose. For a more detailed discussion of this
case, see infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
138. Dyer, 722 F.2d at 179 (citation omitted).
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evidence that the consultation was in furtherance of fraud, often after in camera
examination. The scope of the exception has also been increased recently by the
rapid and continuous growth in the federal criminal law, particularly in the
proliferation of statutes intended to attack white-collar crime and to enforce
administrative regulation schemes. As more types of wrongdoing traditionally
within the province of the civil law are criminalized, it becomes easier to make
out a case that the defendant consulted his or her attorney in furtherance of
crime. The exception naturally becomes more available as the number of predi-
cate crimes increases.
Until a century ago, the exception was only available if the client consulted
the attorney intending to commit some crime that was malum in se.13 9 The
difficulty, which gave rise to the result deplored by Chancellor Walworth in
Bank of Utica v. Mersereau,14° was that crimes mala in se were not co-extensive
with actions generally held to be morally wrong.141 In particular, a fraudulent
conveyance was merely malum prohibitum, perhaps because it was neither an
indictable offense at common law nor a statutory felony, but a statutory misde-
meanor of Elizabethan date. The decision of the Queen's Bench in Regina v.
Cox142 was revolutionary partly because it disregarded the distinction between
mala in se and mala prohibita. On the other hand, Cox can be read as reaffirm-
ing the importance of the real or underlying distinction by focusing on the
blameworthiness of the clients' intention as viewed by the standards of ordinary
commercial morality. By contrast, the overwhelming modern tendency is to ex-
tend the exception to all crimes, without regard to the blameworthiness of the
client's exploitation of the attorney's advice. If a client consults an attorney in
furtherance of some action prohibited by statute, the privilege is dissolved with-
out any examination of whether the breach is morally reprehensible.
As a result, the crime-fraud exception has been expanded in two ways.
First, the imposition of criminal penalties as an ordinary sanction for the viola-
tion of administrative and regulatory schemes naturally increases the reach of
the exception. Second, the increase in the number of statutes prescribing crimi-
nal penalties for such offenses as making false reports to the government or fail-
ing to make full disclosure in various commercial contexts tends to make moot
the question whether a broad or narrow definition of fraud shall control for
purposes of the exception. If the mere act of knowing misrepresentation is crim-
inal, it is irrelevant whether such elements of common-law fraud as reliance and
damages are present. These two modes of enlargement overlap extensively be-
cause so many regulatory statutes of relatively recent date are concerned with
full disclosure.
139. See supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
140. 3 Barb. Ch. 528 (N.Y. 1848). See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 31.
142. 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884). Cox is discussed supra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
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A. The Expansion of Criminal Sanctions Broadens the Reach
of the Exception
The complexities of modem administrative regulation have occasioned a
great-one authority says "amoeba-like" 14 3-growth in federal criminal law.
Criminal penalties for violations of the Sherman Act, 144 the Securities Act of
1933,145 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,146 and for willful tax
evasion1 47 have long been established. Recent concern for protection of the en-
vironment has brought many new crimes into existence.148 In an effort to attack
organized crime, new federal legislation criminalizes activities legitimate in
themselves. 149 Above all, the post-Watergate era has seen a new demand for full
disclosure of actual and potential conflicts of interest and for conformity to
stringent ethical standards on the part of public officials and corporations, re-
flected in new criminal legislation such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 150
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
151
adopted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,152 is a striking
example of a modem criminal statute (also giving rise to civil liability) 53 whose
enforcement has been aided by the exception to the rule forbidding the gathering
of evidence from the mouth of the defendant's attorney. RICO criminalizes the
investment in a legitimate business of money "derived directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt
m . ..any enterprise. . . in interstate commerce." 154 RICO also forbids
143. Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches
and the Problematic Line between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 117, 126 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as From Tort to Crime].
144. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (made a felony in 1974, Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708 (1974)).
145. Id. § 77x.
146. Id § 78ff(a).
147. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982).
The advice an attorney gives a defendant almost certainly will be relevant to the issue of willful-
ness, which is an element in offenses under both securities acts, and to the "no knowledge" defense if
it is raised in mitigation of the penalty under 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982). The assertion of the "no
knowledge" defense may impliedly waive the privilege. See supra text accompanying note 123.
148. See, eg., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1982);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614-2616 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1977); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982)
(disposal of hazardous solid waste); Clean Air Act, id § 7413(c).
149. In addition to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1982) (see infra text accompanying notes 151-58), see the Interstate and Foreign
Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises Act (Travel Act), id. § 1952.
150. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (amending
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)-(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, &
78ff (1978)). Because the Act forbids payments to foreign officials and political parties to gain a
business advantage or to influence legislation in a foreign country, §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, it also must
require for the first time that corporations keep internal accounting systems in reasonable detail
(ending the use of "slush funds").
For a general discussion of this development, see Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime:
Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. Rv. 1227 (1979).
151. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
152. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
153. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964-1968 (1982).
154. Id. § 1962(a). A "pattern of racketeering activity" means the commission of two or more of
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use of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise,155
conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,' 56
and conspiracy to violate any provision of RICO.'5 7 On occasion prosecutors
have attempted to prove RICO violations by compelling the defendant's lawyer
to testify to legal advice given about investments in legitimate businesses, sup-
posedly made with proceeds of racketeering activity. Such advice is in further-
ance of the violation, even though the attorney neither knows nor suspects the
source of the money. 158 It also makes no difference that the client does not
know about RICO and is unaware that the investment of his or her ill-gotten
gains is itself an offense. RICO, of course, is aimed at making the prosecution of
organized crime easier (and making the "laundering" of criminal receipts more
difficult) precisely by turning otherwise legal acts into criminal offenses. Some
acts proscribed by RICO are therefore merely mala prohibita, but the crime-
fraud exception still applies.
Federal criminal jurisdiction has also been sensibly expanded by the new
interest of federal prosecutors in pursuing white-collar crime and political cor-
ruption. Prosecutions may be brought under statutes of long standing such as
the Hobbs Act 159 and the mail and wire fraud acts.1 60 The latter make it a
the many state and federal offenses set forth at § 1961(1). It should be noted that two acts are not
necessarily enough to constitute a "pattern." See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct, 3275,
3285 n.14 (1985). Although the offenses are of the sort often associated with organized crime, many
or most could be committed by an individual.
An "enterprise," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982), means any association that functions
for financial gain, whether organized for legitimate or illegitimate ends. See United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); cf. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1983) (politically
motivated conspiracy of Croatian terrorists is not a RICO "enterprise").
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
156. Id. § 1962(c).
157. Id. § 1962(d).
158. Reported cases are few, but the point is illustrated by United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp.
839 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The government recorded telephone conversations between Loften, the al-
leged head of a heroin ring, and Socolov, his lawyer. It justified this intrusion into attorney-client
communications on the grounds that Socolov was primarily giving business advice. Id. at 845.
Socolov was indicted for conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982). At trial he as-
serted the attorney-client privilege to suppress the wiretap evidence. Loften, 518 F. Supp. at 845.
The district court found that the evidence was admissible on two grounds: most of Socolov's
advice related to business rather than legal matters, and the occasional bit of legal advice given was
in furtherance of the investment of racketeering income. It did not matter whether Socolov knew
the source of the funds, so long as there was evidence that they were derived from racketeering.
Once the privilege was lost on account of Loften's consulting an attorney in furtherance of RICO
violations, the communications were admissible against Socolov. Id. at 848.
In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984), reflects another common pattern. Here the grand
jury sought the attorney's records of money paid or property given to him by clients under investiga-
tion for violations of RICO; the attorney himself was apparently not a target. "[Tihe government
seeks fee information as evidence of unexplained wealth which may have been derived from criminal
activity. . . and as evidence of violation of the tax laws." Id. at 63 (citations omitted). The court
held, quite properly, that neither fee information nor the identity of clients nor the identity of those
who pay their legal bills is considered confidential, adding in dictum that the records might be
confidential if they could be used to support an inference of concerted activity among the clients. Id.
at 64. The crime-fraud exception is often invoked, however, in cases involving the identity of clients
or the amount of fees paid. See infra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982) (forbidding extortion). Extortion is defined, inter alia, as "the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced. . . under color of official right." Id.
§ 1951(b)(2).
160. Id §§ 1341, 1343.
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felony to use the mails, wire, radio, or television communications in interstate
commerce for the purpose of executing a scheme or artifice to defraud. They
have been interpreted by some courts as effectively criminalizing breaches of
private fiduciary duty that cause no tangible injury to the beneficiary, as well as
betrayals of the public trust by elected officials of the sort often called "crony-
ism"-that is, favoritism not clearly attributable to bribery or extortion and ef-
fected without damage to the public treasury.
161
This recent emphasis on white-collar crime presents prosecutors with new
temptations to make the examination of attorneys an integral part of their inves-
tigations (often through use of the grand jury subpoena power), as well as new
opportunities to do so. This trend has been much decried by civil libertari-
ans. 162 It is paralleled by the penchant of the IRS, the SEC, and other agencies
for demanding the confidential communications of attorneys in the course of
civil investigations. 163 In all such investigations, the prosecutor or agency is
161. Such, at least, is the interpretation of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., in two articles: From
Tort to Crime, supra note 143, and The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the
"Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Coffee,
The Metastasis of Mail Fraud]. He cites two recent appellate cases, United States v. Bronston, 658
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (despite absence of any evidence that client was harmed, attorney was con-
victed for personally representing a client in a known conflict of interest with another client of his
firm, without disclosing such conflict), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982), and United States v.
Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), aff'd by an equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), as representing the utmost reach of successful
prosecutions for mail/wire fraud to date. Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud, supra, at 11-15.
"[O]ne alternative theory of liability [in the latter case] was that Governor Mandel presented false
information to, or concealed material information from, the relevant authorities to advance the inter-
est of his cronies, thereby depriving the citizens of Maryland of his honest and faithful services." Id.
at 15 n.68. No evidence was necessary under this theory to show that Mandel had benefited in any
tangible way, and no specific or quantifiable injury to the public had to be shown. Cf United States
v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149-52 (7th Cir.) (receipt of bribe by Governor of Illinois constitutes
federal mail fraud, although the "defrauded" citizens of Illinois suffered no monetary loss), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). This case is criticized in Comment, The Intangible Rights Doctrine and
Political-Corruption Prosecutions under the Federal Mail-Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 562,
567-72, 587 (1980) (legislative history of mail-fraud statute reveals that it was intended to proscribe
only the use of the mail to obtain property by false pretenses).
These cases and others create such decisive advantages for the prosecution that federal prosecu-
tors supposedly repeat the maxim "when in doubt, charge mail fraud." Coffee, supra note 143, at
126 n.45. In addition to the advantages mentioned above, Professor Coffee argues that mail fraud as
now interpreted is an inchoate crime because what is punished is the existence of a scheme to de-
fraud, not the act of defrauding. In contrast, at common law a contemplated fraud must be reason-
ably close to fruition before it is punishable.
162. See, ag., Weiner, supra note 128, at 96 n.4 (list of cases in which civil rights organizations
have intervened as amici curiae); Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 27 HASrINGs L.J. 1263 (1976).
163. The power of the IRS to issue administrative summonses is set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7602
(1982) (significantly expanded by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, § 333, Pub.
L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 622-23); that of the SEC in 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982); and that of the
FTC in 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1982). Such summonses are issued without probable cause. See, e.g., United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (IRS). In addition, the United States Department of Justice
may issue so-called "civil investigative demands" (CIDs) in antitrust investigations, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1311-1314 (1982), and in connection with RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1982). Since 1976, antitrust
CIDs may be served upon natural persons and may require oral testimony. Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, §§ 101-102, Pub. L. No. 95-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1383-87. See generally White-Collar
Crime: Third Annual Survey of Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 279, 578 (1984) (concerning use of
administrative summonses) [hereinafter cited as White-Collar Crime]; Wilson & Matz, Obtaining
Evidence for Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of investigative Meth-
ods, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 651 (1977) (concerning use of administrative summonses, grand jury
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likely to argue that the communications sought were in furtherance of the crime
or breach under investigation 1 " and therefore not privileged. Matters are made
worse for the defendant by a procedural difficulty. Although the United States
attorney may be compelled to identify which statutes' possible violation is the
subject of a grand jury investigation, it is not possible to contest a subpoena on
the ground that the specific wrongdoing alleged is not prohibited by the statute
cited. Such a determination can only be made after indictment, by a motion to
quash. 165 The result is that the target's attorney may be compelled to testify on
the grounds that the client consulted him or her in furtherance of actions which
do not, in fact, constitute an offense. There is little protection against a prosecu-
tor's most reckless imaginings about the reach of some criminal statute. And
once the privilege is overcome, the attorney must testify about all confidential
communications.
United States v. Dyer' 66 illustrates the extraordinary ploys often used by
prosecutors. Dyer, a real estate developer and a member of the New Orleans
Planning Commission, was indicted for extortion in violation of the Hobbs
Act. 167 Dyer's attorney had written 168 and hand-delivered 69 a letter to the al-
leged victim (who was cooperating with the FBI) in which the money allegedly
extorted was enclosed. The letter gave no real reason for the return of the
money, but Dyer explained in a telephone conversation with the informant that
he had solicited the money to test the informant's willingness to corrupt public
officials. 170 The government sought a superseding indictment, claiming that the
return of the money constituted the obstruction of justice in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512. Dyer's attorney was subpoenaed to testify before the second
grand jury about the conversations that preceded the return of the money.
t17
subpoenas, court authorized and consent searches, voluntary disclosures, information obtained from
related civil regulatory matters, and foreign documents in federal economic criminal prosecutions).
In this context SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675 (D.D.C. 1981), should be
noted. The SEC's civil complaint was based largely on interviews with defendant's attorney, which
the attorney consented to give to obtain probation after his conviction for embezzling large sums
from the defendant and his law firm. The court refused to dismiss because the SEC had not actively
solicited privileged information. Id. at 686. Gulf & Western's failure to establish that the informa-
tion gained was indeed privileged, and not merely business advice, is understandable considering that
the SEC did not transcribe its eleven days of interviews with the attorney. The agency did, however,
tell the attorney's lawyer that it did not wish to hear any privileged communications. Id. at 684.
164. The prosecutor or agency may accomplish this through a so-called Schofield affidavit. See
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.) (A Schofield affidavit requires "a
minimum showing ... that each item sought was (1) relevant to an investigation, (2) properly
within the grand jury's jurisdiction, and (3) not sought primarily for another purpose."), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1015 (1975). Contra In re Ousterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
165. See, eg., In re Grand Jury, 619 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (3d Cir. 1980) (target may not argue on
a motion to quash a subpoena that the short filling of beer bottles does not violate 26 U.S.C. § 5412
(1976) despite "ingenious contentions").
166. 722 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1948).
168. Dyer, 722 F.2d at 177.
169. Id. at 176.
170. Id.
171. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's
determination that the drafting and delivery of the cover letter were prima facie evidence that Dyer
had consulted his attorney in furtherance of the crime of obstructing justice. Id. at 178. This con-
clusion seems dubious. The letter, taken by itself, provides no evidence as to Dyer's original motive
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By seeking a superseding indictment, the prosecutor sought to turn a past of-
fense- extortion-into a continuing one and thus to strip the cloak of the privi-
lege from any confession or admission made by Dyer.1 72 Had the prosecutor
been incorrect in characterizing the return of the money as an "obstruction of
justice," the attorney probably could not be compelled to testify to his client's
admissions at trial because the failure of the superseding indictment would mean
that the communications were not made in furtherance of crime. 173 The prose-
cutor, however, would have had the advantage of cross-examining the attorney
about the details of his client's confession despite an ultimate determination that
the crime-fraud exception was never applicable.174
It is not surprising that the proliferation of administrative crimes should
have led prosecutors to rely more heavily upon the crime-fraud exception. But
such proliferation has also presented plaintiffs' attorneys with an extraordinary
opportunity, in purely civil actions, to compel the discovery of the confidential
communications of defendants' counsel, on the grounds that such communica-
tions were in furtherance of some crime. It does not matter whether such crime
gives rise to a civil cause of action 175 or whether the cause of action sued upon is
in soliciting the money. If the cover letter had contained the same unlikely explanation that Dyer
gave over the telephone for the return of the money, it would more clearly be manufactured
evidence.
172. This use of a superseding indictment is not unique. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Dated January 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985),
defendant was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin. After he retained a new attorney, he was
reindicted for organizing a continuing criminal narcotics enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1970), entitling the government to the forfeiture of his traceable profits from the enterprise. The
new attorney was subpoenaed before the grand jury in connection with a second superseding indict-
ment and asked about his fee arrangements, with the implicit threat that he would be called to testify
against his client at trial, thus compelling his disqualification, and would forfeit all fees for an unsuc-
cessful defense. The subpoena was upheld despite the court's acknowledgment that the information
sought was clearly incriminating. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
quashed the subpoena on appeal, however, because its predominant purpose was preparation for trial
on the indictment already pending.
173. The court of appeals stated, however, that Dyer would run a high risk of waiving the privi-
lege if he should put his attorney's letter into evidence at trial. Dyer, 722 F.2d at 178.
174. Cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1984). Marc Rich & Co., the intervenor, had failed to pay substantial fines for civil contempt
levied as a result of its failure to comply with a previous subpoena to its attorney. The grand jury
now was investigating Rich's transfer of a wholly-owned American subsidiary to its president, alleg-
edly with the intention of becoming judgment-proof in the United States to avoid the fines. The
district court upheld the grand jury's subpoena with regard to documents concerning the transfer, on
the theory that the sale was an obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982) or a
conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982)-the very crimes
under investigation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this rationale, but upheld
the subpoena in part. The court expressed great skepticism about the prosecution's theory that the
transfer was in violation of federal statutes. The subpoena was proper, however, because there was
evidence tending to show that the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance under New York law. Thus
the attorneys were ordered to testify, even though it was apparently likely that any indictment for
violation of federal law would ultimately be quashed. Again one must wonder whether the prosecu-
tor's real aim was not to gather evidence from the attorneys for use in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion for contempt-the offense undoubtedly committed.
175. RICO provides a civil cause of action. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. RICO
has proved a powerful adjunct to the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982), because
"predicate offenses" of § 1961 include 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1982): "[A]ny offense involving. ..
fraud in the sale of securities." Targets of unfriendly corporate takeovers have struck back with the
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intimately connected with such alleged crime. Particularly popular are allega-
tions that the client consulted an attorney in furtherance of a conspiracy to mo-
nopolize trade in violation of the Sherman Act or to defraud the Patent Office.
Now that the Supreme Court has upheld an ingenious application of the civil
aspect of RICO to contract disputes between legitimate businesspersons,176 we
may expect to see discovery requests based upon the theory that legal advice
concerning the interpretation of contracts was obtained in furtherance of racke-
teering activity. One suspects that such discovery efforts are made at times
merely to embarrass the other attorney or to force a change of counsel.
International Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United Telephone Co. 177 is an
interesting example. International Telephone & Telegraph Co. (ITT) had a con-
tract to install a telephone system at a retirement village. Defendant sought to
block the contract by filing a complaint with the Florida Public Service Commis-
sion, which was mooted by the cancellation of the contract.178 ITT thereupon
brought an action for tortious interference with contract and antitrust violations;
it sought to discover privileged communications between defendant and its at-
torney concerning the institution of the complaint with the Public Service Com-
mission. 179 ITT's theory was that a review of the commmunications would
reveal the complaint to be frivolous and a sham. The communications, there-
fore, were in furtherance of a felony-the attempt to monopolize interstate trade
or commerce in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The court refused to allow discovery of the attorney-client communications
for failure to make a colorable showing that the proceedings were indeed a
sham. 180 The court thus rejected plaintiff's theory for overcoming the privilege
because of its circularity. ITT was assuming the very thing to be proved: a
review of the communications would show that defendant's attorneys had ad-
vised their client that the action was without merit.'81 Apart from the court's
conservative approach to the required preliminary showing, the opinion evinced
no disapproval of plaintiff's theory. The merit of such theory, from ITT's point
of view, was that the privileged material would be discoverable without any
showing of common-law fraud or fraud upon the court because the bringing of a
frivolous action was under these circumstances supposedly also a felony.
allegation that the filing of two or more inaccurate Forms 13D that conceal the raiders' real inten-
tions constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity. Advantages over a garden-variety securities ac-
tion include less onerous standing requirements, treble damages, and the publicity advantages of a
charge of "racketeering." See Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1513 (1983).
176. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3281-84 (1985) (holding that no "racketeer-
ing injury" apart from that caused by the predicate offenses themselves need be proved and implying
that the predicate offenses may be proved by merely a preponderance of the evidence). Id. at 3283-
84.
177. 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
178. Id. at 182-83.
179. Id. at 179.
180. Id. at 182.
181. Many other courts in parallel circumstances have ordered the production of such privileged
documents or at least examined them in camera without requiring any preliminary showing. See
supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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B. The Criminalization of False Reporting Expands the Definition of Fraud
for the Purpose of the Exception
There are more than one hundred statutes that proscribe false statements to
the Government. 182 The most inclusive of these statutes is probably 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, con-
ceals or covers up by any trick, scheme or device a material fact, or
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations,
or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
18 3
Other more specific federal examples can be found in title 18, chapter 47,
"Fraud and False Statements," forbidding, inter alia, the making of false state-
ments for the purpose of inducing HUD to accept, extend, or renew a loan guar-
antee; 184 the making of false statements by a contractor or others with respect to
work done, or to be done, on a federal highway project; 185 and the making of
false statements concerning citizenship or residency status.186 These prohibi-
tions are apart from the criminal penalties set forth for misreporting or conceal-
ing material facts in, for example, the tax and securities contexts, and the
catchall prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce" in the Federal Trade Commission Act.
187
The existence of numerous statutes criminalizing false reporting and mis-
representations to third persons tends to make moot any debate over whether
the exception applies only to communications in furtherance of common-law
fraud. The elements of the common-law tort of deceit are misrepresentation of a
material fact, scienter, reliance, and damages. 188 Only one modern case has re-
quired evidence of these elements as a condition to the applicability of the excep-
tion,189 and there the party seeking disclosure could easily have argued on the
182. See White-Collar Crime, supra note 163, at 341 n.480.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). This statute is notable because it prescribes more severe penalties
for unsworn statements than for statements under oath. See id. § 1621 (five years' imprisonment or
$2,000 fine for making false statement under oath).
184. Id. § 1010.
185. Id. § 1020.
186. Id. § 1015.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
188. See, eg., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1123 (1981). Professor Prosser adds a fifth element to the four mentioned: "[a]n intention to induce
the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation." PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
189. In Research Corp. v. Gourmet's Delight Mushroom Co., 560 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
defendants in a patent infringement action wished to see communications between the applicant for
the patent (plaintiff's assignor) and his attorney during the application process, on the theory that
such communications were in furtherance of "fraud on the Patent Office." Defendants had strong
extrinsic evidence of misrepresentation in the application of "prior art."
The district court, however, refused discovery because there was no showing of actual fraud.
Id. at 820. The defendant would have to show detrimental reliance and change of position on the
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facts that the confidential communication was in furtherance of a breach of 18
U.S.C. § 1001. In contrast, courts in two New Jersey cases, In re Callan 190 and
Fellerman v. Bradley,'9' denied that the exception is available only when com-
mon-law fraud has been committed, extending it to "fraud upon the court":
There is no reason to believe that the use of the word fraud in [New
Jersey Evidence Rule 26(2)(a)] is to be limited to conventional notions
of tortious frauds. Acts constituting fraud are as broad and as varied
as the human mind can invent. Public policy demands that the fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege . . . be given the broadest
interpretation. 1
92
The Alaska Supreme Court has similarly characterized the bad-faith nonpay-
ment of an insurance claim as "civil fraud" for the purpose of the exception,
193
although the assertion of frivolous defenses to an insurance claim has little in
common with the tort of deceit. Apart from these three cases, no court in con-
sidering the crime-fraud exception has discussed the meaning of fraud.1
94
This omission is less surprising when one notes the great predominance of
federal cases in this area. In both civil and criminal cases it is almost always
possible to allege that the defendant has consulted an attorney in furtherance of
a federal crime; it is then irrelevant whether such crime can properly be called a
fraud as well. Perhaps the paucity of state cases involving the crime-fraud ex-
ception reflects the lack of a parallel increase in state criminal jurisdiction in
administrative matters.
part of the examiner-in other words, that the patent would not have been issued but for the appli-
cant's misrepresentations. Such a showing is the same as a prima facie case that the patent was
entirely invalid (although some courts have declared a patent unenforceable for lesser misrepresenta-
tions). See 2 P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 15.08 (2d ed. 1985) (citing illustra-
tive cases). Interestingly, the declaration signed by an applicant (on oath) specifically warns that
willful false statements (even if they do not necessarily invalidate the patent) are punishable by fine
or imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (1984). Defendant in Re-
search Corp. could have argued that the applicant committed the crime of concealing a material fact
from a federal agency, and thus any communication in furtherance of such crime should be
discoverable.
190. 122 N.J. Super. 479, 496, 300 A.2d 868, 877 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 126 N.J.
Super. 103, 312 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 66 N.J. 401, 331 A.2d 612
(1975).
191. 99 N.J. 493, 503-04, 493 A.2d 1239, 1245 (1985) (Defendant in a divorce action flouted a
court order incorporating his agreement to pay accountant's fees by leaving the jurisdiction. Such
removal constituted fraud on the court, and his attorney could be compelled to reveal his new ad-
dress, although communicated in confidence.).
192. Callan, 122 N.J. Super. at 496, 300 A.2d at 877. The case concerned the active connivance
of two attorneys in their clients' flouting of a court order and subsequent concealment of such diso-
bedience. On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court found the attorneys innocent of any such com-
plicity. In re Callan, 66 N.J. 401, 406-07, 331 A.2d 612, 615-16 (1975). Having metaphorically
characterized these actions as "fraud on the court," the chancellor supposed it necessary to define
fraud broadly to circumvent the privilege. The better view is that under these circumstances the
privilege never attached. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
193. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 33 (Alaska 1974). The decision in
Werley seems wrong because the insurance company did not assert a defense of good-faith reliance
upon the advice of counsel. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
194. The court in Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz, & Tyler, P.C., 107 Mich.
App. 509, 309 N.W.2d 645 (1981), simply assumed that a breach of fiduciary duty-nondisclosure
by the corporation's attorney of a business opportunity to a 50% shareholder-was a species of




Of course, cases do exist in which the courts have applied the crime-fraud
exception without ever characterizing the wrongdoing involved as crime or
fraud. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 18, 1981 and January 4,
1982 195 is an instructive example. A grand jury was investigating Brooklyn
Congressman Fred Richmond, who, in violation of House Rule 4.7, supposedly
had earned an amount greater than fifteen percent of his government salary from
the Walco National Corporation, a company of which he had formerly been
chairman.1 96 Richmond's pay was disguised as a pension for past services. The
grand jury subpoenaed all the communications between Walco's attorney and
Richmond concerning the pension agreement, and the district court ordered
production of the communications on the grounds that they were all in further-
ance of Walco's fraud on the House Ethics Committee. 197 Such "fraud" con-
sisted of a letter from Walco's attorney seeking an advisory opinion regarding
Richmond's pension arrangements and representing that Richmond would re-
sign as Chairman of Walco. In fact, the resignation was a sham. There was,
however, no evidence that the attorney was aware of any wrongdoing.
The court, ignoring the elements of the common-law tort of deceit, did not
explain how the drafting of the pension agreement furthered any "fraud" by
Walco or indeed what the fraud was. The advisory opinion was not binding on
the Committee, and it is hard to see how the Committee relied upon the letter.
Moreover, it was Richmond who supposedly violated Rule 47, not Walco, and
the purpose of the misrepresentation was to enable Richmond to continue sitting
in Congress. Finally, although in some sense the Committee conferred a benefit
upon Richmond, any "detriment" suffered by the Committee was highly
inchoate.
The court failed to discuss any of these points, stating merely that "[t]he
government has established a prima facie case that Walco sought the attorney's
advice to further a future wrongdoing."' 19 8 Yet if the court had relied on
"crime" instead of "fraud" it could have reached the same conclusion. Walco
used its attorney as its agent for the making of a false representation to Con-
gress-a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.199
195. 561 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
196. Id. at 1255.
197. Id. at 1257.
198. Id. The greatest difficulty was that the communications sought were those from Walco's
attorney to Richmond, asking Richmond for information concerning his future relationship with
Walco and explaining the draft pension agreement. The syllogism underlying the Walco opinion is:
(1) the attorney's request for an advisory opinion was a representation that the pension agreement
accurately described the future relationship between Richmond and Walco; (2) because the agree-
ment was a sham, the representation qualified as a fraud; (3) the attorney acted as Walco's agent in
making the misrepresentation; (4) the pension agreement was drafted in furtherance of the misrepre-
sentation; (5) therefore, all communications between Richmond and Walco's attorney relative to the
pension agreement were in furtherance of fraud. For this syllogism to work, the court must con-
clude (as it did, id. at 1253) that the attorney was representing Walco only.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). It might seem surprising that the House Ethics Committee is a
"department or agency of the United States," but at least one court has so held. United States v.
Hansen, 566 F. Supp. 162, 163 (D.D.C. 1983) (falsification of Congressman's financial disclosure
statement).
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V. "IN FURTHERANCE OF CRIME OR FRAUD. . ."
Thus far this discussion has revealed how the crime-fraud exception has
been expanded procedurally, through a lowering of the evidentiary threshold for
its application, and substantively, by a rapid increase in the number of predicate
crimes, especially in the federal arena. There is a third, less easily categorizable,
manner in which the application of the exception has been expanded: courts
have loosely applied the requirement that the confidential communications
whose production is sought have been made in "furtherance" of crime. This
looseness is probably not accidental and cannot be explained solely as a result of
judicial hostility toward the privilege. Rather the "abuse of discretion" standard
for the review of evidentiary determinations, when applied by appellate courts to
decisions about the availability of the exception, has resulted in conclusory opin-
ions that provide no clear standard for the future.2 °° As a result the exception
has expanded by an accretion of misunderstandings.
The "in furtherance" element of the crime-fraud exception is certainly
opaque. It cannot be taken literally to mean that the communications must
somehow "advance" the commission of a crime or fraud. This fact is shown by
the "two-lawyer" cases in which the client discloses to one attorney facts incon-
sistent with recovery and then changes the story when telling it to a second
attorney. Very properly, courts have held the first communication discoverable,
although obviously it is the second that was perjured and served the client in
committing fraud. 20 1 Similarly, it is unclear how a communication from attor-
ney to client can be in furtherance of fraud when it simply warns that a proposed
disclosure, possibly required by law, may prevent a desired result. 20 2 More gen-
erally, how can any communication from attorney to client, as opposed to one
from client to attorney or from the attorney to a third person, "further" a crime
or fraud unless it reveals that the attorney is an accomplice in the client's illegal
purpose?
20 3
In attempting to define the "in furtherance" element of the crime-fraud ex-
200. A trial court's determination that a foundation exists for the application of the crime-fraud
exception is an exercise of discretion, not to be overturned unless the court abused its discretion to
the prejudice of the defendant. Sedco Int'l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Bernard D. Morley, P.C. v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Colo.
1982); People v. Board, 656 P.2d 712, 714 (Colo. App. 1982). When the court denies a motion to
quash a grand jury subpoena, such denial will be upheld except when "clearly erroneous." In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Lahodny v. United States), 695 F.2d 363, 365 n.2 (9th Cir.
1982). Appellate courts are not disposed, in making this determination, to restate the evidence,
especially when it was originally submitted in camera and exparte, as so often occurs. To a student
of the crime-fraud exception, it is dispiriting to read scores of cases that state the rule in a sentence
and in another sentence state simply that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the exception applied, without discussing the rationale for the rule, specifying the crime or fraud
in furtherance of which the attorney was consulted, discussing the client's intention, reviewing the
supporting evidence, or stating whether and how the attorney's testimony is relevant to the case.
201. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; State v. Phelps, 24 Or. App. 329, 545 P.2d 901
(1976) (defendant admitted to first attorney that the witnesses he proposed to call were not actually
at the scene; attorney withdrew, and the witnesses were unwittingly called by second attorney).
202. For a dubious example, see Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979).
203. This question is raised by In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 18, 1981 and
January 4, 1982, 561 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), the Walco-Richmond case. See supra notes
195-99 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 64
A TTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ception, it will be helpful to set the "two-lawyer" cases aside. Their real ration-
ale is simple. Just as a client cannot expect an attorney knowingly to introduce
perjured testimony,2° 4 a client cannot expect the same attorney to keep silent
when a second attorney introduces such testimony unknowingly. 205 Analysis is
not advanced by saying that the first attorney was consulted "in furtherance of
fraud upon the court." Similarly, one should ignore the occasional case in
which the actual or supposed confidential communication was being offered for
a nontestimonial purpose.
20 6
What is left are the many cases in which the client commits a crime or
fraud after consulting an attorney or induces the attorney to commit a fraud on
the client's behalf. If the attorney wittingly joins in the perpetration of a fraud,
there is no analytical difficulty. The communications between attorney and cli-
ent were obviously in "furtherance" of fraud. The attorney's assistance may,
however, be unwitting. The client may start out with a clear understanding of
the necessity for withholding or misrepresenting material facts, often to conceal
previous wrongdoing. If the attorney then files a report required by law in reli-
204. See Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, rev'g Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.
1985). In Nix a state prisoner sought federal habeas corpus on the ground that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney, learning that he intended to peijure himself as to
facts vital to his claim of self-defense, induced him to testify truthfully by threatening to resign, after
which the attorney would be "allowed" to take the stand to impeach the perjured testimony. Id. at
992. (The Supreme Court did not interpret the attorney's words as "a threat to testify against
Whiteside while he was acting as counsel," id. at 997 n.7).
The Supreme Court unanimously denied the prisoner's petition. The attorney's behavior con-
formed to the Iowa standards of professional conduct and to those generally accepted nationally, id.
at 995-97, and in any case the defendant was not prejudiced thereby. Id. at 999.
205. Of course, this rationale suggests that the first attorney has an ethical duty to come forward
voluntarily, which is not true under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See infra note 287 and
accompanying text.
206. A lurid example is Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 377 Mass. 772, 388 N.E.2d 658 (1979).
Defendant fatally shot his wife in his attorney's presence, in the course of divorce negotiations. A
few minutes later, he asked the attorney if the latter would represent him at trial.
In ruling that the attorney could testify to this remark, the court held that defendant had no
reasonable expectation of confidentiality-which as a reason for overcoming the privilege is wholly
circular. The better analysis is that the remark was offered not for its content as an implicit confes-
sion but for what it revealed about defendant's mental state when it was made. It therefore was
admissible solely as the attorney's observations of the client's demeanor at the time of the shooting,
and the intrusion into the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship was minimal.
The same rationale justified the holding in United States v. Weger, 709 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.
1983). Defendant was convicted of making false statements in a bank loan application in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1982). She had forged a title opinion from her attorney. The government intro-
duced an old letter of innocuous content from defendant to her attorney for the purpose of showing
the identity of the typing with that in the forged opinion.
The court held that the old letter was admissible because the characteristics of the type used in
the letter were not a "communication" and therefore could not be privileged. Of course the jury got
to see the contents of the letter, which were certainly privileged, but also were irrelevant to the
present crime, trivial, and nonprejudicial. The court of appeals was not content to let the matter rest
there, but went on to characterize the client's act of stealing a sheet of her attorney's stationery to
forge the letter as an abuse of the attorney-client relationship destroying the privilege. The court did
not explain, however, why it would be appropriate to destroy the privilege retroactively as to all
communications over the years no matter what their subject. Furthermore, the court's theory as-
sumed that the client stole the stationery-an unproven fact that could have been shown from the
typing and the attorney's testimony. This assumption raises the familiar problem of the circularity
of the prima facie case. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text. The opinion in Weger
exemplifies a common tendency to use the crime-fraud exception as a makeweight, usually in a
sloppy way.
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ance upon such false information, the confidentiality of the relationship has
clearly been abused in furtherance of crime or fraud.20 7 One difficulty raised by
this sort of case has already been considered-how to show that the client know-
ingly concealed the truth, which is the basis for overcoming the privilege, with-
out first examining the confidential communications. 20 8 There is (or was) a
salutary presumption that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the con-
sultation had a lawful purpose. 20 9 The workings of such a presumption can be
seen in an amusing way in an old Kentucky case, Cummings v. Common-
wealth.210 Defendant was a hired hand charged with the murder of his seventy-
three-year-old employer in conspiracy with the latter's wife, age twenty-six, and
her parents, for the purpose of getting the old man's farm. About a month
before the murder, defendant consulted an attorney about bringing an action for
slander against his employer, who had accused him of having an affair with his
wife. When asked if the charge was true, Cummings replied, "Hell, yesl" The
attorney, who doubled as a prosecutor, testified to this undoubtedly relevant
admission over Cummings' objections. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, saying:
[A] person may have a grievance which does not constitute a cause of
action and yet in good faith consult with an attorney in reference to a
contemplated suit, and be advised as to his rights, and, in such case, be
entitled to the privilege ... .211
The lawfulness of Cummings' purpose in consulting his attorney was not vitiated
by the unfortunate revelation that the husband could raise the defense of truth in
a slander action, so long as Cummings did not evince any intention to do the old
man bodily harm.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency in this area for courts to assert that the
cock's crowing made the sun rise, or at least that the client's purpose must have
been unlawful because the consultation was followed by the commission of a
crime.212 This sort of confusion may not be common, but courts have lost sight
207. If knowingly filing a false report is a crime, as it always is under federal law, the client has
used his or her attorney in furtherance of present wrongdoing. However, a court may treat the
cover-up of past wrongdoing as a fraud continuous with, and therefore in furtherance of, the original
offense. See, eg., In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980) (false report
filed with Illinois State Board of Elections, when defendants already knew they were under investiga-
tion, held to be in furtherance of previously made illegal political contributions).
208. See supra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
209. See, eg., Exparte Enzor, 270 Ala. 254, 117 So. 2d 361 (1960). In Enzor an attorney testi-
fied before a grand jury that a client had admitted to him either miscounting election returns or
planning to miscount them, but claimed he could not remember which. He was committed to prison
for refusing to identify the client. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the contempt conviction,
holding that the attorney-client privilege protects confessions of past wrongdoing and any ambiguity
must be resolved in favor of the client. See also SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 232 (D.D.C.
1948) (privilege not overcome when communication may have been made simply to discover if a
certain action had been filed, rather than to induce its filing for fraudulent purposes); In re Selser, 27
N.J. Super. 257, 266, 99 A.2d 313, 317-18 (App. Div. 1953) (privilege not overcome merely on
showing that mobster retained and conferred with attorney 10 to 12 days before attempting to influ-
ence a grand jury).
210. 221 Ky. 301, 298 S.W. 943 (1927).
211. Id. at 310, 298 S.W. at 947.
212. One court quite baldly stated: "If. . .the court determines that the alleged crime occurred
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of the principle of causation with some frequency. Pollock v. United States2 13 is
a good example. The government sought to prove the willful filing of fraudulent
income tax returns by the "increase in net worth" method.2 14 To this end, it
called defendant's attorney to testify to Pollock's deposit of currency with him in
escrow in connection with real estate purchases. The court held that such testi-
mony was not privileged because the communications concerning such deposit
were in furtherance of the crime of tax evasion.2 15 This holding amounts to
saying that it is criminal to spend legitimate earnings on a legitimate object if
one has not paid taxes thereon, and therefore tax evaders cannot communicate
in confidence with an attorney about any subject (at least if they have paid a fee).
United States v. Horvath 216 demonstrates a similar confusion. The client
consulted his attorney for assistance with some investments. Apparently by way
of justifying his special concern with confidentiality, the client explained that he
used to be in the marijuana distributing business, at least implying that such
business was the source of the funds he now wished to invest.2 17 The court held
that the implicit confession was not protected by the privilege because it was in
furtherance of the crime of tax evasion.2 18 Once again, the fact of having and
spending the money is evidence of tax evasion, but is not criminal in itself. Tell-
ing how the money was acquired is not an act in furtherance of tax evasion. The
result is defensible on the basis of the Annesley v. Anglesea 219 analysis, how-
ever.220 The client's admissions were not necessary to the purpose for which he
consulted the attorney and therefore were not privileged.
In contrast, in a recent decision, Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski,
221
the court was unusually careful in its treatment of the causation requirement.
International Systems & Controls Corporation (ISC), like many companies in
the 1970s, established a voluntary special audit committee, assisted by special
counsel, to investigate improper payments to representatives of foreign govern-
ments.222 ISC noted the ongoing investigation in its Form 10K for fiscal year
1977.223 ISC then sold a subsidiary that had constructed a natural gas process-
after consultation with counsel, then. . . the court may find that the crime-fraud exception bars use
of the privileges." In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 804 (3d Cir. 1979); cf
In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[W]e agree that 'mere coincidence in time,'
without more, cannot support the invocation of the exception .
213. 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953).
214. Id. at 284.
215. The court recognized that the fact of the deposit of money was not a "communication" and
that in his role as escrow agent the lawyer was not even acting as an attorney-a broker could have
done the same. The result is thus correct. There is an important difference, however, between say-
ing that the fact of deposit is not privileged and saying that all communications that concerned such
deposit are not privileged because they were in furtherance of crime.
216. 731 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1984).
217. Id. at 561.
218. Id. at 562.
219. 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1139 (1743). For a detailed discussion of Annesley, see supra
notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
220. See supra text accompanying note 30.
221. 751 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1984).
222. Id. at 278.
223. Id.
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ing plant in Algeria to the plaintiff, Pritchard-Keang Nam Corporation (PKN),
allegedly representing that the debt owed by the Algerian government for the
plant was collectible in full.224 Fulbright & Jaworski (Fulbright), ISC's general
counsel, furnished an opinion letter in connnection with the sale stating that
there was no governmental investigation pending or threatened against the sub-
sidiary.225 Eight months later, the SEC filed suit against ISC for violations of
securities laws by payments to government officials and intermediaries in con-
nection with the contract to build the Algerian plant. ISC admitted the fact of
payment as part of a settlement without, however, admitting that such payments
violated Algerian law.226 As a result, the Algerian government refused to pay
the balance due on the grounds that ISC had solicited the contract by making
illegal payments to private persons.
227
PKN thereupon sued Fulbright for negligence in rendering its opinion let-
ter and sought discovery of the draft report of special counsel to the audit com-
mittee, which general counsel had seen before drafting the opinion letter.228 The
district court ordered production of the report, but was reversed by the court of
appeals.
229
Obviously the report was relevant to the issue of the state of Fulbright's
knowledge at the time the opinion letter was prepared and would be evidence of
illegality if its contents suggested ISC actions in violation of SEC regulations.
However, the report was communicated to Fulbright long before ISC requested
the letter. The report was not prepared in furtherance of any fraud (there was
no allegation that either the report or the SEC filing based upon it were deliber-
ately inaccurate) nor was it communicated to Fulbright in furtherance of a fraud
because Fulbright saw the report before the sale to PKN was contemplated.
230
"That the report may helpprove that a fraud occurred does not mean that it was
used in perpetrating the fraud.
' 23 1
The court defended its exclusion of admittedly probative evidence on policy
grounds. Corporations would not conduct internal investigations of wrongdoing
if investigators' reports were discoverable.232 Moreover, only the report, as a
client communication, was not discoverable; the facts contained therein were not
privileged and could be discovered from other sources.
233
VI. CLIENT IDENTITY AND THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
Pollock and Horvath234 are two of many cases in which an attorney was
224. Id. at 279.
225. Id.




230. Id. at 282-83.
231. Id. at 283.
232. Id. at 284.
233. Id.
234. See supra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
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asked to testify regarding the identity of a client, the fact of retainer, the amount
of legal fees paid, or the deposit of money or other property with the attorney. It
has always been recognized that these are facts within the attorney's knowledge,
rather than confidential communications, 235 and that therefore these facts are
not privileged. But at least in the twentieth century, it also has been recognized
that the disclosure of the client's identity may be highly incriminating. Many
courts have concluded that fundamental fairness in certain circumstances pro-
hibits the incrimination of the client by his or her attorney's testimony regard-
less of whether the privilege applies. The result has been the development of at
least three separate but overlapping exceptions to the rule that the identity of the
client and the fees paid are not confidential matters: (1) the "communications
rationale" exception- the client's identity is protected when the revelation of
the client's name will connect the client to a privileged communication the con-
tent of which is already known;236 (2) the "last link" exception-the client's
identity and the fact of retainer are privileged when their release would provide
the "last link" in a chain of evidence tending to incriminate the client, ordinarily
because the government knows that an offense was committed and lacks only the
identity of the offender; 237 and (3) the "legal advice" exception- disclosure of
the client's identity, the fact of retainer or the payment of fees is privileged when
there is a strong probability that disclosure would implicate the client in the very
criminal activity concerning which legal advice was sought.2 38 The crime-fraud
235. The early case of Rex v. Watkinson, 93 Eng. Rep. 1072 (Ch. 1740), held that an attorney
could not be asked the identity of his client, but the reporter remarked "[q]uaere tamen, for this was
to a fact in his own knowledge, and no matter of secrecy committed to him by his client." Id.
236. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1450, 1519
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Privileged Communications]; see United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807
(3d Cir. 1984) (attorneys charged fees only to clients who actually invested in certain real estate
partnerships; court held the attorneys could not be compelled by subpoena to furnish a list of such
clients to the IRS, which would be tantamount to revealing the attorneys' advice about the propriety
of deducting such fees); see also NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965) (privilege may
be recognized when so much information has already been disclosed that identifying the client or
fees paid would amount to disclosure of confidential information); cf United States v. Jeffers, 532
F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976) (attorney may be compelled to testify as to legal fees paid by defend-
ant charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970), engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, an
element of which is the obtaining of "substantial income" therefrom), aff'd on other grounds, 432
U.S. 137 (1976).
237. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir.
1975) (government claimed to possess information that named individuals had paid attorney fees in
excess of their total reported income; therefore, if attorneys identified them as clients and revealed
the amount of fees paid by them, the clients would be effectively incriminated).
238. See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 1983)
(exception did not apply when attorney told court that revelation of client's identity would implicate
the client in the very criminal activity for which advice was sought but failed to testify or submit
evidence to that effect), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984); In re Grand Jury No. 81-1, 676 F.2d
1005, 1009 (attorney may not be compelled to reveal payments by and on behalf of named client
when government's refusal to reveal details regarding the purpose of the grand jury investigation
makes it impossible to determine whether exception applies), withdrawn after target was indicted and
fled, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982).
The three exceptions are often said to derive from the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). In Baird an
attorney paid a certain sum on account of delinquent taxes for an anonymous client, whose identity
the IRS sought to discover. The court refused to order the attorney to testify for the three reasons
later conceptualized as distinct exceptions to the rule that the identity of a client is not privileged
information. First, the content of the anonymous client's privileged communication was already
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exception, in turn, has been applied since the 1970s to defeat these new excep-
tions. This application generally depends on the proposition that the retaining
of an attorney to defend a third party is an action in furtherance of the defend-
ant's crime.
United States v. Hodge & Zweig 239 is a much-cited example. The IRS was
seeking to establish by the "net worth" method that one Sandino, a suspected
drug dealer, had evaded taxes on his illegal earnings. This investigation pro-
ceeded almost simultaneously with a grand jury investigation into the activities
of Sandino and his associates and eventually resulted in a recommendation that
Sandino be criminally prosecuted for tax evasion. 24° The IRS served a civil
summons on the law partners who represented Sandino to discover all fees
which Sandino had paid for his own defense and that of named and unnamed
others. The attorneys objected that such clients would be linked with Sandino in
a drug conspiracy (and some would be identified for the first time) by virtue of
Sandino's having paid their fees.24 1 Sandino and certain others had been in-
dicted and had plead guilty to charges of conspiracy to import marijuana by the
time the district court ordered Hodge and Zweig to comply with the
summons.
242
On appeal, the court held that the identity of the unknown clients was priv-
ileged because disclosure would implicate them in the very criminal activity for
known, at least by inference, viz., "that an additional tax was payable and that the unknown clients
owed it." Id. at 630. Second, the voluntary payment "indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of
taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime." Id. at 633. Third, the
clients consulted the attorney precisely to discover what they might do to avoid criminal and civil
penalties for their former failure to pay. Id.
The court of appeals in Baird relied upon Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566
(1915), for the California law of privilege. Baird, 279 F.2d at 634. In McDonough the California
Supreme Court held that an attorney need not testify as to the identity of a client who employed him
to defend certain others against charges of election fraud and paid their bail. The revelation of the
client's identity would be tantamount to an admission of complicity. The court explicitly held, how-
ever, that there was "nothing illegal or contrary to public policy" in paying for the defense of an-
other for a past crime or in providing his bail. McDonough, 170 Cal. at 234, 149 P. at 567-68. This
view is contrary to the position of most modem courts. See infra notes 247-54 and accompanying
text. The court in McDonough, however, did not discuss whether the unnamed client promised to
pay for the defense of his associates as an inducement for their participation in a criminal scheme.
It will be noted that the court in Baird did not actually impose any requirement that the attor-
ney's testimony furnish the last link connecting the client to the crime. If the exception is based
upon fundamental fairness, the attorney's testimony should be excluded so long as it is "substantially
probative" of the client's guilt. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666,
674 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Shatkin Inv. Corp. v. Connelly, 128 Ill. App. 3d 518, 470 N.E.2d 1230
(1984) (attorney found in contempt of court for refusal to take stand and answer basic questions of a
judgment creditor about former client). It has been argued that the literal application of a "last
link" exception merely invites the government to call the attorney first instead of last. See Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as a Protection of Client Identity: Can Defense Attorneys be the Prosecu-
tion's Best Witnesses?, 21 AM. CR. L. REV. 81, 91 (1983).
The "last link" and "legal advice" exceptions have recently come under strong attack. See infra
note 263 and accompanying text.
239. 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
240. Id. at 1351.
241. Id. at 1352, 1354.
242. Id. at 1350.
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which legal advice had been sought. 243 But Sandino had paid their legal fees to
acquit a promise made to them when they entered into the conspiracy.
244
Sandino's illegal purpose in so doing therefore justified the exposure of the iden-
tity of his unknown co-conspirators.
The decision in Hodge & Zweig is troubling in several respects. The civil
summons was proper only on the premise that the IRS investigation was not
being carried out in aid of the police or the United States Department of Justice
and that no recommendation had yet been made for Sandino's criminal prosecu-
tion.245 If so, the names of those whose defense was paid for by Sandino were
irrelevant; the IRS only needed to know the fact and amount of payment. But
the court imposed no such restriction, apparently reasoning that the privilege,
once overcome, is gone for all purposes. Also troubling is that the prima facie
case for the existence of the conspiracy came from the guilty pleas of Sandino
and others to the allegations in the information that superseded the grand jury's
indictment, 246 even though such pleas hardly meant that the specific facts al-
leged in the information were all true, particularly as to promises supposedly
made to persons whom the government could not identify.
Does Hodge & Zweig support the conclusion that a promise to pay for the
criminal defense of another, if made before the offense has occurred, is necessar-
ily an act in furtherance of crime? In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick)
247
appears to answer in the affirmative. An individual the court referred to as
"Anonymous" promised three sailors that they would be taken care of if caught
on a marijuana-smuggling venture.2 48 They were caught, convicted, granted im-
munity from further prosecution, and asked where the funds came from to hire
their defense attorney and post their bail bonds. They said that they did not
know, whereupon Pavlick, their attorney, was asked the same question.249 The
court held that he must answer, both because the revelation of the benefactor's
identity would not form the "last link" in the chain of evidence incriminating
him and because Pavlick had been hired in furtherance of crime.
250
In Pavlick the full bench of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed a decision by a Fifth Circuit panel.2 51 Judge Politz, who wrote
the panel's majority opinion, dissented on rehearing. In both opinions he em-
phasized that Pavlick was not retained until the marijuana had been seized and
243. Id. at 1354.
244. The indictment of Sandino and the others alleged that such a promise had been made; his
and their guilty pleas constituted the evidence that made out the government's prima facie case. Id.
at 1354-55.
245. Id. at 1350-51.
246. Id. at 1350 n.2. One suspects that the prosecution's purpose in having the defendants plead
to a superseding information was to provide additional evidence in support of the government's
prima facie case that the provision of legal services to the conspirators was an act in furtherance of
the original criminal conspiracy, thus making the crime-fraud exception applicable. See supra notes
166-74 and accompanying text.
247. 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
248. Id. at 1027.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 663 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the three sailors were in jail.2 5 2 The fact that Anonymous retained Pavlick in
fulfillment of his past promise to take care of the three did not mean that the
retainer was in furtherance offuture crime. Therefore, Judge Politz viewed "the
consulting of Pavlick as reflecting the undisclosed client's concern about detec-
tion for past offenses and as an attempt to secure timely assistance in the event of
his apprehension. '253 In his concurrence, Judge Rubin expressed the concern
that the crime-fraud exception could be construed to apply to agreements for the
indemnification of corporate officers and directors in future civil or criminal an-
titrust actions. 254 Such agreements might be viewed as consideration for future
wrongdoing, thereby destroying the attorney- client privilege between the indem-
nifying corporation and its attorneys.
At least one case has built the Pavlick rationale into a paradoxical struc-
ture--the "self-cancelling exception." In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine) 255
concerned an inquiry into the ownership of the motor vessel Nordakrum, found
scuttled and burning off the Louisiana coast. It had been used to smuggle mari-
juana into the United States. Attorney Fine, on behalf of an unnamed client,
had arranged for the formation of Labol, a Netherlands Antilles corporation in
whose name the Nordakrum was registered. Fine was subpoenaed by the grand
jury and asked the client's name.256 The government's theory, accepted by the
district court, was that these circumstances made out a prima facie case that
Labol was formed in furtherance of a criminal scheme to smuggle marijuana
into the United States. Therefore, Fine was ordered to testify.
25 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, to the con-
trary, that this sequence of events, although it raised a "strong suspicion,) 25 8 did
not make out a prima facie case.259 But if the formation of Labol was on its face
legitimate, the revelation of the client's identity could not be incriminating;
therefore, the "last link" exception260 did not apply and Fine could be ordered
to testify.261 The court further stated that revealing the client's identity would
tend to incriminate the client only if Labol had been formed in furtherance of a
criminal purpose. The attorney therefore would be required to testify under any
possible state of the facts.
The court acknowledged that this construction placed the client in a
"Catch-22. ' '262 There was, however, no double bind except in the mind of the
court. First, the revelation of the client's identity would be incriminating re-
252. Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1033, 1061.
253. Id. at 1033.
254. Id. at 1030 n.3. Judge Rubin concurred in the result because of the absence of any evidence
that Anonymous was a client of Pavlick's, as opposed to a mere benefactor of his co-conspirators.
Id. at 1029.
255. 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981).
256. Id. at 201.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 204.
259. Id.
260. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
261. Fine, 641 F.2d at 204.
262. Id. at 204 n. 6 .
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gardless of whether Labol was originally formed for a criminal purpose. It is a
necessary link (if not the last link) in the chain that the government must forge
to convict the client of crime. Second, the client made no affirmative allegation
that Labol was formed for innocent purposes, estopping him from invoking the
"last link" exception. He merely denied that the government had met its burden
of proof on the question whether Labol was formed in aid of a criminal enter-
prise. The court's confusion probably stemmed from Fine's testimony that
Labol was, so far as he knew, formed for legitimate and independent reasons,
but such testimony was consistent with a secret improper purpose on the client's
part and therefore with an attack on the applicability of the crime-fraud
exception.
The self-cancelling exception may prove to be merely a sport in the history
of the privilege. Four federal courts of appeals have already rejected the idea
that fundamental fairness forbids the gathering of evidence from the mouth of a
suspect's attorney unless such evidence is derived from, or will certainly betray,
a client communication.263 This rejection is consistent with (although not man-
dated by) the United States Supreme Court's treatment of self-incrimination and
the attorney-client privilege in Fisher v. United States,264 and one would not be
surprised to see it followed by several other circuits.
Nonetheless, Fine is significant because it is a special case of a common
confusion- the failure of the courts to recognize the necessity of a causal con-
nection between consulting an attorney and the subsequent commission of a
crime. The true meaning of the "in furtherance" requirement is that there must
be evidence of such a connection before the crime-fraud exception may be
brought into play.
265
263. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Investigation
No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983), upheld a judgment of contempt against an attorney who
declined to identify a client from whom he had received a check in payment for legal services, which
check had been drawn upon the account of a fictitious company in which the client had deposited a
stolen check originally made payable to IBM. The government acknowledged that it would arrest
the client as soon as it knew the client's name. The court rejected the "last link" exception simply on
the grounds that the client's identity was not a privileged communication. Although acknowledging
the existence of the "legal advice" exception, the court did not find the exception applicable to these
facts. Accord In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Witnesses Before Special March
1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, has denied the existence of the "legal advice" exception, saying simply
that "no reasonably informed client could have supposed that [fee information] would be protected
from disclosure." In re Ousterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1983).
264. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The Fisher Court held that the attorney-client privilege did not pro-
tect incriminating documents in the hands of the attorney unless the client would have been justified
in refusing to produce them on fifth amendment grounds and that the client would not be so justified
where the documents (accountants' work-papers used in preparing tax returns), although in fact
incriminating, were not "testimonial." Id. at 408. The privilege against self-incrimination thus pro-
tects the client only from testifying against himself, not from producing evidence against himself.
The Court denied that the fifth amendment was intended as a "general protector of privacy." Id. at
401. Justice Brennan vigorously disputed this statement in his concurrence: "[W]hat ... highlights
the opinion [is] the view that protection of personal privacy is merely a byproduct and not, as our
precedents and history teach, a factor controlling in part the determination of the scope of the [fifth
amendment] privilege." Id. at 416.
265. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text.
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VII. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ATTORNEY'S ETHICAL DUTY
OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The narrowing of the attorney-client privilege described in this Article is
implicitly based upon a general view not only of the attorney-client privilege but
also of the character and social role of the relationship between attorney and
client. While the courts have been narrowing the privilege, the legal profession
has been engaging in an intense and sometimes acrimonious debate over the
limits of the attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality to the client. This debate
has had a very public aspect, as attorneys have struggled over amendments to
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) and its successor,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). It is remarkable that
the proponents of a broad view of the ethical obligation of confidentiality have
largely carried the day, at least in the official Model Rules. The attorney's obli-
gation to keep a client's secrets in the ordinary course of events, including plans
to commit crime or fraud, and the obligation to testify against the client under
the crime-fraud exception are formally reconcilable. 266 However, there is a
profound theoretical tension between the view of the attorney-client relationship
implicit in the modern law of privilege and the view of the relationship that
underlies the ethical duty of confidentiality as most attorneys understand it.
Although the primary focus of this Article is on the crime-fraud exception, it is
necessary to make at least a cursory attempt to elucidate the issues at stake.
A. The "Instrumental" and "Intrinsic Value" Justifications for the Attorney-
Client Privilege
For at least half a century most courts and scholars have taken a narrow
view of the proper role of the attorney-client privilege. According to this view,
its only justification is to make possible the obtaining of informed legal advice,
which clients would not seek if they thought that their every disclosure could be
used against them. "[The privilege] protects only those disclosures-necessary
to obtain informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the
privilege."' 267 This rationale for the attorney-client privilege has been called the
"instrumental justification. '2 68 It follows that the privilege must be strictly con-
strued because its application always derogates from the search for truth and
therefore contradicts the principal purpose of a trial, whether civil or crimi-
nal. 2 6 9 In the absence of any empirical studies, it is permissible to infer that the
266. See infra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
267. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 406.
268. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5422,
at 670-71 (1980).
269. See, eg., Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 996-97 (1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(No. 83-1661), 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Special, September 1983, Grand Jury,
(Klein), 608 F. Supp. 538, 542 (S.D. Ind. 1985); 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 268,
§ 5422, at 677 n.64. For a defense of this view, see Frankel, The Search for Truth, an Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
The premise that the purpose of a trial is to discover the "truth" is highly questionable. The
truth being sought is circumscribed by the requirement of legal relevance, which is in turn defined by
the legal rules that determine the outcome. Facts undoubtedly relevant to the whole truth of a
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privilege, even within its present narrow boundaries, is still fulfilling its only
appropriate function so long as clients still confide in their attorneys.270 Indeed,
some authorities, concluding that there is no ready substitute for legal advice,
27 1
see no reason the privilege should not be narrowed still further or even
abolished.
272
By contrast, a minority of commentators has sought to develop a theory of
the attorney-client relationship that treats its human claims more generously.
The other evidentiary privileges-those between husband and wife, priest and
penitent, and therapist and patient-are recognized for the purpose of protecting
intimate relationships from forced betrayal. Clients often have a relationship of
similar intimacy with their attorneys. The particular loyalty to which such a
relationship gives rise is the necessary starting place for a theory of the attorney-
client relationship.273 The claims of society, which find expression as the attor-
situation are excluded as a matter of course. This exclusion is appropriate because our legal system
has never pretended to discover "the truth," only to arrive at morally defensible resolutions of
human conflicts. See United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 810 (3d Cir. 1984) ("It does not
advance resolution of the issue to argue. . . that the attorney-client privilege 'is an obstacle to the
search for the truth.' ") (quoting Appellee's Brief at 8); Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Priorities
Regarding Confidentiality, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 421, 441 n.54 (1984) ("[L]itigation does not
aspire to realize truth as an understanding of reality. Rather, it seeks dispute resolution based upon
the opinion of an arbitrary portion of those persons who comprise a cluster of arbitrary size, ran-
domly drawn from an arbitrary sample.").
270. The author's experience as a litigator, together with the anecdotal evidence of other attor-
neys, suggests another explanation-that clients confide freely in their attorneys because they are
well aware of the privilege and entirely unaware of any exceptions to it. When they learn that
exceptions exist and may be applicable to their cases, they typically are shocked. It is usual for
attorneys, when first interviewing a client, to emphasize that everything the latter says will be kept in
confidence. The author has never heard of any attorney issuing a sort of Miranda warning as to the
limits of confidentiality at the beginning of a professional relationship. Proposed Rule 1.4(b) of the
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980) required attorneys to advise
clients about "the relevant legal and ethical limitations to which the lawyer is subject if the lawyer
has reason to believe that the client may expect assistance not permitted by law or the rules of
professional conduct." Presumably, Proposed Rule 1.4(b) would have mandated just such a Mi-
randa -type warning of clients. See Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak Rules,
and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 739, 786-87
(1981). Professor Hodes hailed this requirement as the "lynchpin" [sic] of the Rules. Id. at 752
n.44. It was deleted, however, from the Proposed Final Draft of Rule 1.4.
271. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Investigation (United States), 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir.
1979) (limitation of corporate attorney-client privilege will not discourage internal investigation of
corporate wrongdoing); Note, supra note 8, at 470-71 (the utility of the privilege can survive substan-
tial practical uncertainty as to its application in particular cases).
272. Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Reporter for the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, articulately
stated this position:
Such a privilege suppresses valuable evidence to which the trier of fact is competent to
give its proper weight. So serious an interference with a rational inquiry can be justified
only by accompanying social benefits of high worth . . . [A] mere sentiment or an out-
grown theory as to relative social values can no more serve as a determining factor than
can a consideration of professional pride of particular callings. If a privilege to suppress
the truth is to be recognized at all, its limits should be sharply determined so as to coincide
with the limits of the benefits it creates.
There are no data to furnish a reasoned support for the privilege in general. The
reason for its creation is exploded: the system into which it fitted as a rational part is gone.
Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 7, 27 (1942). According to Morgan, the reten-
tion of the privilege in any form in the Model Code was a mere pragmatic compromise.
273. A classic exposition of this ethical view is contained in Professor Charles Fried's The Law-
yer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Privilege, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ney's institutional obligations, do not necessarily take precedence over the moral
claims of the relationship. In this view, the values protected by the privilege are
identical with the core values of the fourth and fifth amendments to the Consti-
tution and are not limited to guaranteeing the effective assistance of counsel.
2 74
There is little moral difference between convicting a client by testimony com-
pelled from his or her own mouth and convicting a client by testimony com-
pelled from his or her attorney's mouth. This view may be called the "intrinsic
value" theory of the privilege. 275 It is probably the view held by most working
attorneys.
B. The Duty of Confidentiality and the Crime-Fraud Exception
One virtue of the "intrinsic value" theory is that it helps answer the vexing
question of what limits, if any, should be imposed upon the ethical obligation of
attorneys to keep their clients' secrets. May the attorney ever disclose the crimi-
nal or fraudulent acts of clients, quite apart from compulsion by a court? Is
disclosure ever ethically required? A difficult aspect of these questions is the
relationship between the limits of the duty of confidentiality and the crime-fraud
exception. The broadening of the exception during the last fifteen years has co-
incided with an intensive re-examination of the duty of confidentiality, accompa-
nied by often rancorous debate. The version of the Model Rules adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates in 1983 can be called a victory for the proponents of
the "intrinsic value" theory. As a result, the tension between the testimonial
disclosures mandated by the crime-fraud exception and attorneys' understand-
ing of their ethical obligations is greater than ever.
The ethical entitlement or obligation of the attorney to disclose a client's
wrongdoing does not correspond perfectly with the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney- client privilege, nor should it be expected to. The duty of silence is not
derived from the attorney-client privilege any more than the secrecy of the con-
fessional is derived from the priest-penitent privilege. Rather, the deference with
which courts are willing to treat these ethical obligations gives rise to the several
privileges. Nothing in logic or principle requires courts to honor attorneys' own
conceptions of their duty of confidentiality in full. For example, so far as courts
are concerned, the attorney may keep confidential only what he or she learned
directly from the client ("communications"), whereas the three official formula-
Dean Monroe H. Freedman is another prominent exponent. See, e.g. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1-9 (1975); Freedman, [Untitled Column], 69 A.B.A. J. 866
(1983). Dean Freedman was the Reporter for a polemical alternative to the Model Rules, THE
AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Found.
1980).
274. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Suggested Approach, 64 GEo. L.J. 613, 647-48 (1976).
275. There are, of course, instrumental arguments for a broad construction of the attorney-client
privilege. Experience suggests that attorneys are often successful in dissuading their clients from
illegal and unethical courses of action. Such dissuasion cannot occur if clients are reluctant to dis-
close their plans lest they be betrayed. In fact, the privilege frees the attorney to aggressively per-
suade the client to tell the truth. See Privileged Communications, supra note 236, at 1477. If the
existence of the privilege persuades the client to reveal facts he or she would otherwise keep secret,
the nondisclosure of such communication in court is not a social cost of the privilege. Id.
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tions of the attorney's duty all apparently protect facts learned during the repre-
sentation, including the client's physical characteristics, identity, fee
arrangements, and wholly gratuitous confessions of wrongdoing.276 In fact,
"the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his
client. . . exists without regard to the nature and source of information or the
fact that others share the knowledge, '277 which is emphatically untrue of the
privilege.
The Model Code, adopted in August 1969, left the right or obligation of
attorneys to disclose their clients' past or contemplated frauds in substantial
confusion. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) permitted an attorney to reveal "the
intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to pre-
vent the crime." "Crime" of course is not "fraud," although Canon 37 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, from which the Disciplinary Rule was derived,
has been interpreted to include "fraud" in at least two states.27 s Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(3) originally provided:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall
reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.
279
This obligation is actually broader in scope than the crime-fraud exception be-
cause it requires the attorney to reveal past frauds the attorney has learned of
from the client's own mouth 280 and is not limited to frauds carried out with the
attorney's help (witting or unwitting).
276. "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). "[A] lawyer shall not knowingly: (1)
Reveal a confidence or secret of his client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
4-101(B) (1980). Under DR 4-101, "'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-
client privilege. . . , and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship
... the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client." Id. DR 4-101(A). Compare CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1967) ("It is the
duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences"; "confidences" is undefined.) with id. Canon 6
("[the obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or
confidences. .... ).
277. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980).
278. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1967), states:
The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confi-
dences which [the attorney] is bound to respect. [The attorney] may properly make such
disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is
threatened.
The Commission that drafted the Model Rules, in MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 comment (Proposed Final Draft 1981), remarked that "Canon 37 was interpreted to in-
clude not only intended crimes but intended frauds as well. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 137
(1953). This interpretation was implicit in related provisions of the CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, such as Canon 41 (requiring the disclosure of unrectified frauds) and Canon 29 (requiring
the disclosure of'perjury')." Whatever the truth of this contention, Mr. Drinker cited local opinions
in New York and Michigan only.
279. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (1971).
280. The obligation takes precedence over the general duty of confidentiality by virtue of MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1980): "A lawyer may reveal: . . . (2)
Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules. .. ."
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As these implications sank in, there was a general protest from the working
bar.281 Finally, in 1974 the ABA House of Delegates amended Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(B)(1) by adding the words "except when the information is protected
as a privileged communication. '282 Thus the substantive law of privilege, in
particular the rapidly developing crime-fraud exception, became the measure of
the attorney's obligation to reveal client fraud.
283
This might seem a workable compromise, although it meant that the ABA
had surrendered the national character of the Model Code and indeed the power
to define the scope of the duty of confidentiality to the inconsistent course of
local decision. What is worse, because the privilege applies only to the court-
room and its scope is determined in the context of an adversary proceeding, it is
impossible to say whether the privilege exists outside such context. These
problems were addressed the following year in a way that unfortunately created
new difficulties. In a Formal Opinion, the ABA Committee on Professional Eth-
ics equated "privileged communications" with "those confidences and secrets
that are required to be preserved by DR 4-101.11284 Because DR 4-101 includes
all "information gained in the professional relationship," whether or not it is
privileged, the result was to obliterate the disclosure obligation of DR 7-
102(B)(1), except in the improbable event that the attorney learned of the fraud
in a manner wholly independent of the relationship with the client.285
This and other problems gave rise to widespread agreement that the Model
Code was unsatisfactory. 286 As a result, the ABA formed a Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards in 1977 charged with the reform of the
Model Code. The Commission decided to eliminate compulsory disclosure of
client wrongdoing except when necessary to avoid actually assisting in crime or
fraud or to rectify the results of such assistance in the past 287 and decided to
281. Dean Monroe Freedman led a campaign to put the question of attorneys' duty to reveal
fraud to a referendum of the District of Columbia bar. Seventy-four percent of those voting opposed
the imposition of such a duty. As a result the District of Columbia Court of Appeals "emasculated"
DR 7-102(B)(1). See Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV.
89, 98 n.38 (1977).
282. ABA, Summary of Action taken by the House of Delegates: Midyear Meeting 3 (1974).
The amendment was adopted by only 12 states. Hodes, supra note 270, at 779.
283. However, it should be noted that the Disciplinary Rule conditions the obligation of disclo-
sure on the receipt of "information clearly establishing" the fraud. The ABA House of Delegates
interpreted this condition as exempting the attorney from disclosure if he or she has a reasonable
doubt that the fraud occurred. ABA: Summary of Actions of The House of Delegates: Annual
Meeting 32 (1975).
284. ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341, slip op. at 4,
reprinted in 61 A.B.A. J. 1543, 1544 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Formal Op. 341].
285. On the effect of Formal Op. 341, supra note 284, compare Kramer, Clients' Frauds and
Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in Professional Irresponsibility, 67 GEO. L.L 991, 994 (1979),
and 55 ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 901, 903 (1984), with
Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality and the Adversary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 653, 689
(Formal Op. 341 leaves the attorney with the right to disclose client fraud.).
286. See, eg., Patterson, Wanted A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J. 639
(1977).
287. Proposed Rule 3.3(a)(2) required disclosures of fact "necessary to prevent a fraud on the
tribunal." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(2) (Proposed Final Draft
1981). Proposed Rule 4.1(b) prohibited a knowing failure to disclose a fact to a third person when
such disclosure is necessary to prevent assisting a criminal or fraudulent act. Id. Rule 4.1(b), This
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replace compulsory disclosure with permissive disclosure:
A lawyer may reveal. information [relating to representation
of a client] to the extent the lawyer believes necessary:
(2) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudu-
lent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substan-
tial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another;
(3) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudu-
lent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been
used.
28 8
The Commission's stated intention in formulating this Proposed Model Rule
was to tie the attorney's right to reveal client wrongdoing as closely as possible
to the scope of the evidentiary privilege, which the authors identified as one
source of the duty of confidentiality, 28 9 and to "generally applicable principles of
agency law," which prohibit an attorney from committing torts, including the
tort of fraud, on behalf of a client.290 But the requirement of substantial injury
was a significant departure from the obligation to disclose intended crimes, pre-
sumably including administrative violations, found in both the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics and the Model Code. The requirement was, and was probably
intended to be, a refusal to follow the substantive extension of the crime-fraud
exception characteristic of the preceding decade.
29 1
The discretion to disclose conferred upon the attorney by the Proposed
Model Rule was far from neutral. The comments make clear that disclosure,
except to prevent knowing assistance in a criminal or fraudulent act, is a luxury
made available to the morally scrupulous at their own risk.292 An exercise of
discretion in favor of silence is unchallengeable from the standpoint of profes-
sional ethics, whereas disclosure is always subject to review.
Having thus strikingly limited the obligation to disclose client fraud, the
drafters must have been shocked at the mauling that the Proposed Model Rules
took on the floor of the ABA House of Delegates. Discretionary disclosure
under Model Rule 1.6 was limited to the prevention of crimes threatening death
duty was effectively converted by the House of Delegates into a mere obligation to withdraw from
representation. See infra note 295.
288. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
This standard is, and was intended to be, broader than the reference to information "gained in" the
professional relationship found in the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101
(1980).
289. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
290. Id.
291. "The provisions of [Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2)] are based upon the interest in harm preven-
tion, not the prevention of misconduct as such. Crimes and frauds whose likely consequences are
insubstantial are not subject to disclosure. ... Id.
292. "The term 'may' define[s] areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional dis-
cretion." Id. Scope. "A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action . . . does not violate this
Rule." Id. Rule 1.6 comment. On the other hand, "it is very difficult for a lawyer to know when
such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out." Id. Therefore, the preferred course is to per-
suade the client "to take suitable action."
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or substantial bodily harm, eliminating disclosure "to rectify the consequences
of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's
services had been used."'293 The obligation to "reveal material facts to third
persons to avoid assisting in crime or fraud" was qualified in the adopted version
of Model Rule 4.1 by the addition of the words "unless disclosure is prohibited
by Rule 1.6." This amendment, replacing the obligation to disclose with an obli-
gation merely to withdraw from representation, nullifies the disclosure require-
ment in precisely the way that Formal Opinion 341 of the Committee on
Professional Ethics nullified the disclosure requirement of Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(3)(1). 294 Even the obligation of disclosure to the tribunal did not escape
unscathed.
295
Thus, the conflict between the instrumental theory of the crime-fraud ex-
ception and the ethical duty of confidentiality is now more acute than it has ever
been. Practitioners have defiantly brought the disciplinary rules into agreement
with the "intrinsic value" theory of the attorney- client relationship, which prob-
ably always has been the working morality of most attorneys.296 This morality,
when applied to the problem of voluntary disclosure, simply forbids the attorney
to become a client's partner or agent in crime or fraud, by withdrawal from
representation if necessary (but even then without unduly prejudicing the cli-
ent's affairs). 297 Beyond that prohibition, there is no duty to prevent injury to
others, least of all by the revelation of anything the attorney knows by virtue of
his or her professional role.
As we have seen, this view implicitly contradicts the attorney's obligation
to testify under the crime-fraud exception. The ethical problems that flow from
this conflict were resolved by the Model Code il a simple way. When called to
testify, the attorney is required to assert the privilege if he or she thinks it appli-
293. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(3).
294. "The lawyer is not permitted to reveal the client's wrongdoing, except where permitted by
Rule 1.6. However, the lawyer is required to avoid furthering the [criminal or fraudulent] purpose,
for example, by suggesting how it might be concealed. . . .Withdrawal from the representation,
therefore, may be required." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 comment
(1983). A commentator has complained that in making this change, the House of Delegates ignored
the fact that a large majority of states declined to adopt the 1974 amendment to Model Code DR 7-
102(B)(1). Nahstoll, supra note 269, at 437.
295. Rule 3.3 was amended to read:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client ....
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983). This formulation permits the attor-
ney under certain circumstances to deceive the tribunal by silence (although not by knowingly offer-
ing peijured testimony, Rule 3.3(a)(4)). By contrast, the Proposed Rule forbade the attorney to "fail
to disclose a fact in the circumstances wherc -e failure to make the disclosure is the equivalent of
the lawyer's making a material misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.3 (a)(1) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
296. Some evidence that this is so may be found in the 1972 referendum of the District of Co-
lumbia Bar on DR 7-102(B)(1), in which 74% of those voting took a position against obligatory
disclosure of client fraud. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
amended the Rule accordingly. Note, supra note 281, at 98 n.38; see also G. HAZARD, ETIICS IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAW 53 (1978) (report of a symposium held at Seven Springs Center in 1976).
297. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)-(d) (1983).
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cable. 298 The attorney may even invite a citation for contempt if that is an ap-
propriate method of getting the issue of privilege finally resolved on appeal. But
the Model Code explicitly provides that "[a] lawyer may reveal ...
[c]onfidences or secrets when. . . required by law or court order."' 299 More-
over, failure ultimately to comply with such order is a violation of Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(A)(3).
Thus under the Model Code the attorney has an almost unbounded duty of
confidentiality, far broader than the privilege, which when it collides with the
privilege reverses field and becomes an ethical duty to disclose. The new Model
Rules reach the same result in a curiously indirect way. They set forth the obli-
gations of confidentiality without making any reference to the possibility of
court-compelled disclosure. Both the attorney's duty to assert the privilege and
the duty to comply with a court order appear only in the Comment to Model
Rule 1.6 and cannot be inferred from anything in the text.
30°
Thus both the Model Code and the Model Rules make the attorney's duties
as an officer of the court independent of and always superior to the duties to his
or her client. The rationale presumably is that the legal system is entitled to
obedience as the embodiment of important societal judgments and values, and
attorneys, as representatives of that system, have a special responsibility to it.
Therefore, attorneys can never find themselves in a conflict of loyalties, which
might lead at best to an unseemly spectacle and at worst to genuine tragedy. But
a layperson might be excused for wondering what validity the professional ethics
of confidentiality have when they conflict so violently with the considered judg-
ment of the courts. Or to put it crassly, by what magic does a subpoena convert
a duty to conceal into a duty to reveal, especially when the duty to reveal is
derived from the duty of attorneys not to help their clients commit fraud? Of
course, another explanation for the rule that attorneys are ethically bound to
obey disclosure orders is simple prudence. Attorneys are excused in every case
from the courageous and self-sacrificing (if perhaps misguided) action which
journalistic ethics on occasion require of newsmen. Attorneys never have to go
to jail for their clients.
It is interesting to contrast the forthright treatment given to this issue in the
American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (ALCC), of which Dean Freedman was the
Reporter. The ALCC rejects the concept that the attorney is an "officer of the
court" 30 1 and does not shrink from the logical result that there is no professional
duty to obey a court order requiring disclosure.30 2 The ALCC rule, while not
requiring martyrdom, takes seriously the possibility that an attorney may feel
298. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980).
299. Id. DR 4-101(C)(2).
300. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (1983) ("Rule 1.6(a) re-
quires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable.").
301. THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Preface (Discussion Draft 1980) ("In the
context of the adversary system, it is clear that the lawyer for a private party is and should be an
officer of the court only in the sense of serving the court as a zealous, partisan advocate of one side in
the case before it.").
302. Id. Rule 1.2 comment.
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duty-bound not to comply with a disclosure order, either because the court has
wrongly limited the privilege or because there is an inherent conflict between the
privilege and the attorney's obligation to his or her client.
This discussion began by noting that the attorney-client privilege, like other
privileges, has its origin in the deference that the courts saw fit to pay to an
existing confidential relationship. The courts recognized the independent neces-
sity and positive value of the relationship and perhaps they recognized that, as
with Catholic priests, 30 3 compelling testimony probably would have been a prac-
tical impossibility. The same considerations are tending to produce new privi-
leges today, such as a privilege to protect journalists' sources and a psychiatrist-
patient privilege. Perhaps the legal profession must take collective responsibility
for bringing the attorney-client privilege more nearly into harmony with its own
view of what is necessary and ethically appropriate. The alternative is to adopt
the views of its critics, often cogently argued, and base the ethical obligation of
confidentiality frankly upon the instrumental view of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. The adoption of such a view would surely require the recognition of a
meaningful duty voluntarily to disclose client crime and fraud without the com-
pulsion of court process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely, may be
pursued too keenly, may cost too much: and surely the meanness and
the mischief of prying into a man's confidential consultations with his
legal adviser, the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, un-
easiness and suspicion and fear into those communications which must
take place, and which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must
take place uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay for truth
itself.304
It is customary to conclude an Article such as this with recommendations
as to the direction that the law should take in the future. The reader will not be
surprised to learn that the author favors a reversal of most of the trends de-
scribed herein-in particular, a reinstatement of the Shewfelt rule,305 requiring
the opponent of the privilege to make out a prima facie case with extrinsic evi-
dence; a requirement that a federal grand jury make a special showing of need
and inability to get the equivalent information by other means before subpoena-
ing the counsel of the target of its investigation;30 6 and far more careful atten-
tion on the part of the courts to the causal connection between the purpose for
which the client consulted the attorney and the fraud allegedly planned or
committed.
303. On the justification of the priest-penitent privilege, see In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 428,
467 P.2d 557, 565, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (1970) (legislative extension of privilege to clergy but not
to psychiatrists not irrational).
304. Pearce v. Pearce, 16 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 153, 159 (1846) (Bruce, V.C.).
305. See Showfelt, 455 F.2d at 840; supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
306. This suggestion, unfortunately, has been rejected by the majority of circuits that have con-
sidered it. See Weiner, supra note 128, at 117-21.
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In addition, because the crime-fraud exception is predicated on the blame-
worthiness of the intention with which counsel was consulted, before confiden-
tial communications can be disclosed there should be a requirement that the
client knew or reasonably should have known either before or after he or she
sought legal advice that the act contemplated was illegal. For example, if the
client consulted an attorney in furtherance of an act innocent in character, such
as a legitimate investment the making of which is a criminal offense under
RICO, the crime-fraud exception should not apply unless the client knew or
learned that such investment was a criminal offense. Such a rule would tend to
halt the expansion of the exception in lockstep with the growth of criminal pen-
alties. Finally, if the government compels a defense attorney to testify before a
grand jury on the basis of a prima facie case of fraud or crime that cannot be
established at trial, not only should the attorney's evidence be excluded at trial,
as it is at present, but information gathered by the government as a result of the
attorney's grand jury testimony should be excluded as well-a "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree" rule.
30 7
The new developments in the law of attorney-client privilege traced in this
Article are, however, in part simply additional unfortunate consequences of de-
velopments in the federal criminal law that are undesirable for many other rea-
sons. The modem tendency of federal criminal law is to federalize state crimes
and to criminalize common-law torts. This trend has placed a new power in the
hands of federal prosecutors, which they have not been reluctant to exploit. One
mode of exploitation has been unprecedented intrusions into attorney- client re-
lationships. Quite naturally, civil litigators have seen the offensive capabilities of
the new federal criminal law when yoked with modern principles of discovery.
It is past time to seriously examine the social cost of these developments, includ-
ing their effect on the relationship between attorneys and their clients.
307. The author is indebted to Professor Christopher B. Mueller for this suggestion.
The colorful phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" is often used by courts in criminal cases to
describe the principle that evidence obtained as a result of a violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights is inadmissible against the defendant. See, eg., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484-
88 (1963).
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